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SHERMAN ACT
DEBORAH E. KLEIN*
WILLIAM BUCKLEY BRIGGS**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Intercollegiate athletics have been extensively criticized for failing
to establish and adhere to satisfactory academic standards for student
athletes. I In response to such pressure, the National Collegiate Athletic
Association ("NCAA") Division I and II institutions have adopted certain academic requirements which must be met by incoming freshman
athletes in order for the athletes to be eligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics. These requirements, referred to in the vernacular as
"Proposition 48," were first introduced in 1987. The effect of Proposition 48 is to limit the Division I and II universities' ability to permit the
athletes who do not meet the requirements to participate in intercollegiate athletics, during the athletes' freshman year, although the students
may attend a Division I or II university on scholarship or may participate
athletically at a junior college or a non-Division I or II school. 2 Thus,
* Attorney for the Federal Trade Commission. A.B. 1982, University of Michigan;
J.D. 1988, University of Toledo College of Law. The views expressed in this article do not
represent those of the Federal Trade Commission or of any individual commissioner.
** Visiting Associate Professor at the New York State School of Industrial and Labor
Relations at Cornell University. Lecturer, University of Pennsylvania Law School. B.S.
1976, Cornell University; M.A. 1978, George Washington University; J.D. 1982, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, recently conducted an examination of NCAA statistics on graduation rates of football and basketball
players, at the request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, one of the sponsors of the Student
Athlete Right To Know Act. Many Athlete Graduation Rates Below 2076, N.Y. Times, Sept.
10, 1989, at 1, col. 2. The study is divided into a section covering the 103 schools classified as Division 1-A in football and another section covering the 97 of those 103 schools
that also had basketball programs. Id. Data was collected from September 1982 to September 1987 and the graduation rate was based on the completion of degree requirements
within five years. Id. at 18, col. 1.
A draft of the report shows that 35 of the 97 schools surveyed for basketball had
graduation rates of 0 to 20 percent among players; that 33 colleges had graduation rates of
21 to 40 percent; 11 had graduation rates of 41 to 60 percent; 10 had graduation rates of
61 to 80 percent; and 8 had graduation rates of 81 to 100 percent. Id. at 18.
For example, Deion Sanders, former defensive back for Florida State University,
helped lead his team to a victory in the 1989 Sugar Bowl, despite the fact that he had
stopped attending classes months earlier, had taken no exams and had passed no courses.
Sanders was able to compete because he had enrolled in classes for the semester preceding the Sugar Bowl. The Old College Lie: Slavery, Hypocrisy and The Campus Athlete, Philadelphia Enquirer, Oct. 15, 1989, (Magazine), at 36.
2. A college's decision to admit a student is independent of any restrictions Proposition 48 may place on the student's ability to participate in athletics. "[Proposition 48]
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Proposition 48 has the effect of limiting the athlete's ability to compete
3
in his or her sport for one year.
Recent developments suggest that the application of the federal
antitrust laws to institutions such as colleges and universities may be
appropriate. 4 The Justice Department is investigating whether certain
colleges and universities, by setting similar levels of tuition and financial
aid, are in violation of the antitrust laws. 5 This article will focus on a
potential antitrust challenge to the NCAA's Proposition 48 under federal antitrust laws by a male college basketball player who is ineligible to
compete under Proposition 48. Do the presumably "good motives" of
the NCAA in adopting Proposition 48 pass antitrust muster, or are the
anticompetitive implications of Proposition 48 too broad to withstand
scrutiny? It should be noted that the type of analysis contained herein
may be applicable to other arguably anticompetitive restrictions imposed by the NCAA.
For the purposes of determining athletic eligibility, the 1989-90
NCAA Manual divides entering freshmen into three categories: Qualifiers, partial qualifiers and nonqualifiers. Under Section 14.3.1.1 of the
NCAA Manual a qualifier is defined as:
establishes a minimum standard only for athletics eligibility; it is not a guide to a student's
qualifications for admission to the institution. Under NCAA legislation, a student's admission is governed by the regularly published entrance requirements of each member institution." GUIDE TO THE COLLEGE FRESHMAN ELIGIBILITY SC REQUIREMENTS FOR NCAA
DivisIoN I AND II INSTITUTIONS 11 (1989).
3. See McKenna, A Proposition With a Powerful Punch: The Legality and Constitutionalityof
NCAA Proposition 48, 26 Duo. L. REV. 43, 68-78 (1987), for a comprehensive statistical
analysis of the effect of Proposition 48 on various conferences and schools.
4. A Wesleyan University student, Roger Kingsepp, has filed a class action suit in
federal district court in New York against Wesleyan and I1 other private universities and
colleges. Kingsepp v. Wesleyan University, Civil Action No. 89-6121 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6,
1989). See also Student Sues WesLeyan on Tuition-Fixing, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1989, at 21, col.
4. Kingsepp contends that the colleges "engaged in a conspiracy to fix or artificially inflate
the price of tuition and financial aid." Id. On behalf of all students affected by the practice, Mr. Kingsepp seeks treble damages under section one of the Sherman Act.
5. The justice Department has sent formal requests for information to "about 20"
schools to determine if those colleges and universities fixed prices in violation of the Sherman Act. U.S. Investigates Prestigious Universities, Colleges for Possible Antitrust Violations, Wall
St. J., Aug. 10, 1989, at B4, col. 3. John Burness, a vice president of Cornell University,
one of the schools under investigation, stated that:
[H]igher education is the only industry that has as its fundamental purpose the
open exchange of information. From accreditation reviews to curriculum and the
publishing of research results, we openly share information with institutions with
which we compete for faculty and students. Our admissions publications, for example, state clearly that we discuss financial aid policies and practices. We believe these policies and practices are legal.
Suit Charges Tuition-Fixing, Cornell Alumni News, Nov., 1989, at 12-13.
According to a recent account, "at least 57 of the nations' most prestigious private
colleges and universities are the subject of the inquiry." Like Fall Applicants Colleges Await
Fate, Wash. Post, April 7, 1990, at 1, col. 4.
TheJustice Department's New York office has reportedly begun an inquiry into activities of United States Swimming, the national governing body for that sport. Inquiry Into
Antitrust Allegations, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1989, at 41, col. 4. The inquiry is based on allegations that United States Swimming interfered with an attempt by the New York Amateur
Sports Alliance to sponsor a swim meet. There are also allegations that United States
Swimming operates as a monopoly. Id.
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one who is a high school graduate and who presented the following academic qualifications:
(a) A minimum cumulative grade-point average of 2.000
(based on a maximum of 4.000) in a successfully completed
core curriculum 6 of at least 11 academic courses, including at
least three years in English, two years in mathematics, two years
in social science, and two years in natural or physical science
(including at least one laboratory class, if offered by the high
school).7

(b) A minimum 700 combined score on the Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT), verbal and math sections, or a minimum
15 composite score on the American College Test (ACT). The
required SAT or ACT score must be achieved under normal
testing conditions.

8

A qualifier is eligible to receive financial aid and participate in intercollegiate athletics in his of her first academic year.
A partial qualifier is a student who does not meet the requirements
for a qualifier, but who presents a cumulative grade-point average of at
6. Core curriculum requirements for Division I schools must be met as of the time of
graduation from high school. For division II schools, core curriculum requirements must
be fulfilled prior to initial enrollment at a collegiate institution. See NCAA MANUAL
§ 14.3.1.1.2.1(a) and § 14.3.1.1.2.1(b) (1989-90), respectively.
7. The record of the above courses and course grades must be certified on the high
school transcript or by official correspondence. See NCAA MANUAL § 14.3.1.1 (a) (198990).
8. In addition to § 14.3.1.1 (Proposition 48), the NCAA has also introduced for consideration what has become known as Proposition 42. Proposition 42 states in part that:
(2) An entering freshman with no previous college attendance who matriculated
as a nonqualifier in a Division I institution and whose matriculation was solicited
per § 0.1.100 shall not be eligible for financial aid, regular-season competition
and practice during the first academic year in residence, except that a high school
graduate who presents an overall accumulative minimum grade-point average of 2.000 but
who fails to present the required grade-point average in the core curriculum and achieve the
required test score may receive financial aid based upon institutional and conference regulations. A nonqualifier orpartialqualifiershall be entitled to three seasons of eligibility per Bylaw 5-1 -(d) subsequent to the initial year of residence at the certifying
institution. (Emphasis in original).
This restriction applies to Division I schools only. Proposition 42 also states that:
(3) An entering freshman with no previous college attendance who matriculated
as a nonqualifier in a Division I institution and whose matriculation was solicited
per § 0.1.100 shall not be eligible for regular-season competition and practice
during the first academic year in residence; however, such a student whose admission and financial aid were granted without regard in any degree to athletic ability
shall be eligible for nonathletic financial aid, provided there is on file in the office
of the director of athletics certification by the faculty representative, the admissions officer and the chair of the financial aid committee that admission and financial aid were so granted. A nonqualifier orpartialqualifier shall be entitled to three
seasons of eligibility per Bylaw 5-l-(d) subsequent to the initial year of residence
at the certifying institution.
At the NCAA annual convention in January, 1990, the NCAA voted 258-66-1 to adopt
a new regulation, Proposition 26, in lieu of Proposition 42. N.C.A.A. Eases Its Restrictions on
Aid to Athletes, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1990, at 1, cols. 3-4. The new regulation would still
prevent incoming freshmen who fail to achieve minimum college-entrance exam scores or
a 2.0 grade-point average from receiving athletic scholarships and from participating in
sports for one year. Proposition 26 does, however, allow these student-athletes to receive
financial aid based on their family income. Id.
This article does not address the legality of or the issues involved in either Proposition 42 or Proposition 26.
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least 2.000, based on a 4.000 scale, at the time of graduation from high
school. 9 A partial qualifier may receive financial aid from the institution,
but may not practice or compete during his or her first academic year. '0
A non-qualifier is a student who either has not graduated from high
school, or who presented neither the core curriculum grade-point average and SAT/ACT score required for a qualifier, nor the grade-point
average required for a partial qualifier. II A non-qualifier is not eligible
for competition or practice during his or her first academic year. 12 The
above requirements apply to Division 113 and Division 1114 institutions,
but do not currently apply to Division III 5 schools. Although the regulations establish a minimum standard for athletic eligibility, admission to
the university is nevertheless governed by the entrance requirements of
the member institutions. t 6 Accordingly, the only possible waiver of
these initial eligibility requirements for Proposition 48 students must be
initiated through the member institution after the prospective student
has been admitted. 17 The waiver must be "based on objective evi9. See NCAA MANUAL § 14.02.9.2 (1989-90) (defines partial qualifier).
10. Id. at § 14.3.2.1.
11. Id. at § 14.02.9.3 (defining non-qualifier).
12. Id. at § 14.3.2.2.
13. Division I membership requirements are delineated in the NCAA MANUAL § 20.9
(1989-90). These requirements include a minimum of six varsity intercollegiate sports,
including at least two team sports, involving all male teams or mixed teams of males and
females, and a minimum of six varsity intercollegiate sports, including at least two team
sports involving all-female teams. NCAA MANUAL § 20.9.3.3 sets out the minimum
number of contests required for team sports and individual sports. Section 20.9.4 lists the
requirements for Division I in basketball scheduling.
14. Division II requirements are set out in NCAA MANUAL § 20.10 (1989-90). A Division II school must sponsor four varsity intercollegiate sports, including at least two team
sports, for both male and female teams. Section 20.10.3.5 lists the minimum contests and
participants necessary for qualification as a Division II institution.
15. Division IIImembership is defined in § 20.11. A school must sponsor four varsity
intercollegiate sports, including at least two team sports, for both males and females. Section 20.11.3.2 sets out the minimum contests and participation requirements.
16. In a survey of 2348 college presidents, deans and admissions officers, conducted
by U.S. News and World Report, almost one of every four respondents admitted, "the
issue of separate admission standards for athletes had created conflict or controversy" at
their institutions. A New Era on Campus, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Oct. 16, 1989, at

56-57.
17. Under NCAA regulations, a student does not possess an independent right to
appeal an ineligibility determination under Proposition 48. See GUIDE TO THE COLLEGE
FRESHMAN ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR NCAA DIVISIONS I AND II INSTITUTIONS, Mar.

1989, at 10-11. The waiver requirements provide that:
[T]he NCAA Council Subcommittee on Initial-Eligibility Exceptions may grant
exceptions to the initial-eligibility requirements of this legislation based on objective evidence that demonstrates circumstances in which a student's overall academic record warrants the waiver of the normal application of this regulation. All
appeals under this regulation must be initiated through a member institution that
has officially accepted the prospect for enrollment as a regular student. Prospective student-athletes should contact the involved member institution for more information concerning this waiver process.
An exception also may be granted for a student who left high school after
completion of the junior year or during the senior year to enter a Division I or II
member institution under an early admissions program solely on the basis of outstanding academic performance and promise. An exempted student must have
maintained an accumulative 3.500 grade-point average and must have ranked in
the top 20 percent of the class for the last four semesters completed in high
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dence" demonstrating circumstances warranting such a waiver.' 8
Though there would seem to be several bases on which a student-athlete
could challenge Proposition 48, a recent Supreme Court case has significantly weakened the likelihood of a successful constitutional challenge
to this legislation. In ruling on the constitutional issue involved in
NCAA v. Tarkanian,19 the Supreme Court seemed to have resolved the
issue in favor of the NCAA. The Supreme Court rejected the argument
that the NCAA is a state actor for constitutional purposes, which appears to dramatically limit the opportunity for an athlete to challenge
Proposition 48 on constitutional grounds. 20 In Tarkanian, the issue was
whether the NCAA's participation in the events leading to Jerry
Tarkanian's suspension as basketball coach at the University of Nevada
Las Vegas ("UNLV") constituted state action as prohibited by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment 2 l and were performed
under color of state law within the meaning of Section 1983.22 The
Tarkanian Court noted the dichotomy between state action under the
2 3
fourteenth amendment and private conduct.
The Court found that the NCAA was an organization independent
school. In addition, all requirements of a qualifier (core curriculum and test
scores) must be met except graduation from high school.
Id.
18. For example, Eric Manuel, once a player at the University of Kentucky, was ruled
ineligible to compete in intercollegiate basketball by the NCAA for having allegedly
cheated on his ACT entrance exam. Under NCAA regulations, Manuel had no right to
appeal the NCAA ruling, even though he denied the allegation of cheating. He was therefore forced to transfer to Hiwasse College, a two-year institution. Manuel must now wait
for an NCAA member institution to sign him and initiate an appeal process to attempt to
restore his NCAA basketball eligibility. Banished Player Yearns for Rescue, N.Y. Times, Nov.
27, 1989, at 35.
19. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
20. See Id. The NCAA's Committee on Infractions found 38 violations of its recruiting practices by the University of Nevada Las Vegas, and 10 violations by Tarkanian. The
NCAA imposed sanctions against UNLV; UNLV suspended Tarkanian. Tarkanian sued
UNLV and the NCAA in Nevada state court, alleging a violation of his fourteenth amendment due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Tarkanian received injunctive relief and attorneys' fees from the state court. The court concluded that the
NCAA's conduct constituted state action for jurisdictional and constitutional purposes and
that its decision was arbitrary and capricious. The NCAA appealed to the Supreme Court.
21. "No State shall .. .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . "U.S. CONST., amend XIV, cl.1.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Tarkanian, 109 S.Ct. at 461-63 n.14 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
23. The protections of the fourteenth amendment do not extend to "private conduct
abridging individual rights." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722
(1961). The pertinent inquiry, in Justice Stevens' view in Tarkanian, was whether the
"[sitate provided a mantle of authority that enhanced the power of the harm-causing individual actor." Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 463-65. See alsoJackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419
U.S. 345 (1974). "[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the
latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Id. at 351.

DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 67:2

of any state. 24 In the Court's view, UNLV retained the authority to withdraw from the NCAA and establish its own standards. 25 Further, the
Court held that "[tihe NCAA is properly viewed as a private actor at
odds with the State ....-26 Thus, since the NCAA enjoyed no governmental powers, 2 7 it was to be considered a private entity. In addition,
the NCAA's function of fostering amateur athletics at the collegiate level
28
was not a traditional, exclusive state function.
Given the limitations that Proposition 48 places on certain athletes
and the apparent status, after Tarkanian, of the NCAA as a private, nongovernmental entity, the question becomes: On what grounds might an
athlete challenge Proposition 48? Tarkanian seems to decrease the likelihood of a successful constitutional challenge. This article will examine
the ability of a Proposition 48 student-athlete to challenge Proposition
48 under the antitrust laws, specifically section one of the Sherman
Act. 29 In particular, this article will address the Proposition 48 restriction as it pertains to men's college basketball.
In college basketball, member institutions of the NCAA earn mil24. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
"[W]hatever de facto authority the [private standard setting] Association enjoys, no official
authority has been conferred on it by any government .
Id.
25. Tarhanian, 109 S. Ct. at 461.
26. Id. at 462.
27. The NCAA did not have subpoena power, power to impose contempt sanctions or
to assert sovereign authority over any one individual. Id. at 461-62.
28. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483
U.S. 522 (1987). "Neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports has been a
traditional government function." Id. at 545.
29. There are several other possible challenges to Proposition 48. There may be a
cause of action for the tort of interference with contract, or interference with prospective
business relationship or business advantage. Another possible challenge to Proposition
48 may lie in its racially discriminatory impact upon blacks. Thus, Proposition 48 may be
subject to an attack on its discriminatory impact or effect under the equal protection
clause, or under a civil rights statute. The Presidents Commission of the National Collegiate Athletic Association has commissioned a report on the effects of participation in
intercollegiate athletics on student-athletes who are black. See Report No. 3. The Experiences
of Black IntercollegiateAthletes at NCAA Division I Institutions, Center for the Study of Athletics,
American Institutes for Research, March 1989. Among the findings of the study was that
58% of black football and basketball players, 19% of nonblack football and basketball
players, 35% of other black student-athletes, and 27% of black extracurricular students
score in the lowest quartile on the SAT (752 or below). Id. at 2. One educator has written
that "[t]hese 'objective' tests are certainly economically, if not racially biased, and their use
as a litmus test disproportionately affects black youngsters." Healy,John Thompson's Protest:
The Academic Background, GEORGETOWN, Winter 1989, at 7. Georgetown University recently
traced the college grades of 224 high risk students over seven years. These students had
SAT scores of 900 or lower. Eighty-nine percent of these students have graduated from
Georgetown and the remaining eleven percent are currently enrolled at Georgetown. Id.
These statistics may have some bearing on the alleged discriminatory impact of the SAT
tests and therefore on Proposition 48.
According to the NCAA, more than 90% of the 242 basketball and football players
who lost their eligibility in the first year of Proposition 48 were black. P. HoosE, NECESSITIES, RACIAL BARRIERS IN AMERICAN SPORTS, at 157 (1989). University of Nebraska football coach Tom Osborne, holder of a Ph.D. in educational psychology, stated "[d]uring the
time I was doing my graduate work and my field teaching I came in contact with much data
that showed there's about a 100 point cultural bias on the SAT test ....Because of this, I
think that many minority students are at a disadvantage when taking these examinations."
T. Osborne, Three Views on Proposition 48, NEW PERSPECTIVES, Winter 1988, at 6.
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lions of dollars from NCAA sanctioned regular season games and from
the NCAA tournament. 30 Since the one-year ban on eligibility imposed
by Proposition 48 prevents a player from receiving significant exposure
and training which may be instrumental in preparing him for a possible
professional career, such an athlete may be sufficiently harmed by Prop31
osition 48 to challenge its validity under the antitrust laws.
II.

AMENABILITY TO SUIT

The first issue to be addressed when considering a legal challenge
to Proposition 48 concerns the amenability of the NCAA to a suit on
antitrust grounds. Charles Grantham, Executive Director of the National Basketball Players Association ("NBPA"), has stated that Proposi32
tion 48 "is not an academic issue, but is, in fact, an economic issue."
The most likely vehicle for a plaintiff challenging Proposition 48 on antitrust grounds would be a suit alleging a violation of section one of the
Sherman Act. The NCAA possesses all of the classic elements of a cartel
in that the members establish the terms and conditions under which
33
they compete or do not compete with one another.
Section one of the Sherman Act provides that "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal .... -34 The express language of the Sherman Act

seems broad enough to proscribe nearly all agreements between businessmen. 3 5 However, the Supreme Court has held that only those
agreements which "unreasonably" restrain trade are barred by the act. 36
In Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, Justice Black wrote that,
"[a]lthough this prohibition is literally all-encompassing, the courts have
30. In 1988, the NCAA basketball tournament grossed $68.2 million. The four
schools which advanced to the final round each received $1.2 million, most of which goes
to the athletic departments of their respective universities. Gup, Fout, TIME, April 3,
1989, at 55. The NCAA recently signed a seven-year, one billion dollar television contract
with CBS giving that network the exclusive right to televise all NCAA tournament games
starting with the 1990-91 NCAA season. CBS Lands Sole Rights to NCAA, Binghamton Press
and Sun Bull., Nov. 22, 1989, § C, col. 2.
31. Although millions of dollars are generated by the commercial aspects of college
athletics, the athletes themselves are governed by the NCAA's "Principle of Amateurism."
See NCAA MANUAL, § 2.6 (1989-90) The Principle of Amateurism, which states:
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and
social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is
an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and commerical enterprises.
32. Remarks by Charles Grantham, Executive Director, National Basketball Players
Association, Sports Careers Conference '89, Phoenix, Arizona (May 13, 1989).

33. See McCormick & Meiners, Sacred Cows, Competition, and Racial Discrimination, NEW
PERSPECTIVES, Winter 1988. "The NCAA is a price fixing cartel.. " and "is immune to the

general disdain afforded most cartels." Id. at 47.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
35. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). "Every agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very
essence." Id. at 238.
36. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I (1958); Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246
U.S. at 231; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911).
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construed it as precluding only those contracts or combinations which
' 37
unreasonably restrain competition.
The purpose of the Sherman Act has been to foster economic competition. The Supreme Court has stated that the "[a]pplicability of the
antitrust laws ... rests on the need for vindication of their positive aim
of insuring competitive freedom." '3 8 In the sports law context, recent
caselaw establishes that the NCAA is amenable to a cause of action alleging violations of the Sherman Act. Thus, the argument that the NCAA
should enjoy an exemption from the antitrust laws, as does major league
baseball, 3 9 has been refuted.
In NCAA v. Board of Regents, 40 for example, Justice White, in dissent,
wrote that "the NCAA does not enjoy blanket immunity from the antitrust laws .... ,,41 Similarly, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,4 2 in arguing
that the learned professions should not be excluded from antitrust regulation, the Court stated that, "Congress intended to strike as broadly as
it could in section one of the Sherman Act, and to read into it so wide an
'4 3
exemption as that urged on us would be at odds with that purpose."
In Mackey v. National Football League,4 4 an action was brought challenging the National Football League's ("NFL") rule allowing the
league commissioner to require a club acquiring a free agent to compensate the free agent's former club. The NFL asserted that the restriction
of competition for players' services is not a type of restraint proscribed
by the Sherman Act, 4 5 since the NFL restraints constituted a labor market to which the antitrust laws did not apply. 46 The Mackey court dis37. 356 U.S. at 5.
38. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963).
39. Baseball's antitrust exemption is a historical anomaly. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258, 282 (1972) calling baseball's antitrust exemption an aberration, but noting that the
"aberration is an established one . . . entitled to the benefit of stare decisis." But see
Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1957)(limiting the rule exempting baseball from
the antitrust laws to the business of organized professional baseball); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 243 (1955)(implying in dicta that not all professional sports are outside the scope of the antitrust laws).
40.
41.

468 U.S. 85 (1984).
Id. at 133.

42. 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975). Goldfarb involved the claim that the minimum fee
schedule of a state bar association constituted price fixing in violation of section one of the
Sherman Act. The Supreme Court held the fee schedule to be in violation of the Sherman
Act.
43. See United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). "That
Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust
and monopoly agreements . . . admits of little, if any, doubt." Id. at 558.
44.

543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).

45. Id. at 616.
46.

In Mackey, the NFL cited section six of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988), and

Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). Section six of the Clayton Act provides
that "[t]he labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce." The Apex
Hosiery Court observed that "[riestraints on the sale of the employee's services to the employer, however much they curtail the competition among employees, are not in themselves combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce under the Sherman
Act." Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 503. The Mackey court analyzed the Clayton Act in light of
the intent of the Act to exempt certain union activities from the antitrust laws. Mackey, 543
F.2d at 617. The Mackey court also distinguished Apex Hosiery since it involved restrictions
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agreed, writing: "We hold that restraints on competition within the
'4 7
market for players' services fall within the ambit of the Sherman Act."
The Mackey court cited other professional sports cases which applied the Sherman Act to owner-imposed restraints on competition for
players' services. 48 It could be argued that Proposition 48 is akin to an
owner-imposed restraint on competition, since, although it is imposed
by the NCAA, it was, voted upon by the member institutions and is administered through the member institutions.
In another recent case, Hennessey v. NCAA, 49 the court acknowledged the business aspect of the NCAA, both in terms of providing
coaches and athletic events for the public. In Hennessey, the court held
that the NCAA was not entitled to a blanket exclusion from antitrust
regulations. 50 The court noted that the NCAA and its member institutions, in "presenting amateur athletics to a ticket-paying, television-buying public, engaged in a business venture of far greater magnitude than
the vast majority of 'profit-making' enterprises." ' 5 1 In addition, "[t]he
NCAA has a multi-million dollar annual budget . . ." and "negotiates
and administers for itself or its members television contracts exceeding,
for all sports, over $20,000,000 a year.' '52 These money-making charac53
teristics of the NCAA put it into what can be labeled "big business"
on competition for employee services imposed by the employees themselves, not by employers. Id.
47. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 618.
48. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 617. See also Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Kapp v.
NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aft'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 907 (1979); Smith v. Pro-Football, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Robertson v.
NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers,
348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972), remanded on other grounds, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972);
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971), stay
vacated, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
49. 564 F.2d 1136, 1149 (5th Cir. 1977).
50. Id. at 1148-49.
51. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1149 n.14. Collegiate athletic departments have budgets of
millions of dollars per year. For example, the current University of Iowa budget is $14.2
million for 1989 and is exceeded in the Big Ten Conference by both the University of
Michigan at $18.5 million and Ohio State University at $21.3 million. See Winning Warms
Up "Climate For Giving, " Boosts Enrollment, Cedar Rapids Gazette, May 2, 1989, at 7A. In
1988-89, men's athletics at the University of Iowa had a total of $12,800,000 in revenue.
Of that total amount, $2,420,000 came from men's basketball, $1,2000,000 from televised
Conference play and $1,300,000 from local television. Id.
52. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1149 n.14. See also Johnson, Three Views on Proposition 48,
NEW PERSPECTIVES (Winter 1988).
I believe that athletes should be given more money .... [I]t's almost ludicrous to
have kids bringing in all that money and not benefitting from the proceeds. I'm
not advocating giving them a contract, but there are restrictions under the rules
of the NCAA that prevent these kids from receiving even minor expenses. That's
just ridiculous, because these athletes are bringing in millions of dollars. The
Rose Bowl probably brings in close to eight or ten million dollars for the various
schools.
Johnson, at 12.
53. Perhaps application of the antitrust laws to the business of college athletics is long
overdue.
[Oinly childlike innocence or willful blindness need prevent American colleges
from seeing that the rules which aim to maintain athletics on what is called an
'amateur' basis, by forbidding players to receive pay in money, are worse than
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and thus, within the ambit of the antitrust laws. 54

In Hennessey, the NCAA asserted that it was outside the purview of
the antitrust laws. 5 5 The NCAA cited earlier cases which discussed the

limitations of the Sherman Act to purely commercial objectives. 5 6 For
example, in Marjorie WebsterJuniorCollege v. Middle States Association,5 7 the
court of appeals stated that:
[T]he proscriptions of the Sherman Act were 'tailored .

..

for

the business world,' not for the noncommercial aspect of the
liberal arts and the learned professions. In these contexts, an
incidental restraint of trade, absent an intent or purpose to affect the commercial aspects of the profession,
is not sufficient
58
to warrant application of the antitrust laws.

The Supreme Court has reiterated the view that the primary focus
of the Sherman Act is on combinations having commercial objectives
and is only applied to a limited extent to organizations having other
objectives. 59 Similarly, in EasternRailway Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,60 the Court ruled against the extension of the Sherman
6
Act to areas outside the business world. '
The more recent Supreme Court cases of Goldfarb and Board of Regents, however, support the view that the NCAA is not entitled to a blanket exclusion from the antitrust laws. For example, in Board of Regents,
the paramount question concerning the Court was not whether the
Sherman Act applied to the NCAA at all, but rather whether the particular restraint violated the Sherman Act. 62 In Washington State Bowling Proprietors Association v. Pacific Lanes, Inc.,63 the court of appeals stated that
the recent decisions of the Supreme Court refuted appellants' contention that the Sherman Act only applied to commercial boycotts. Thus,
the weight of recent caselaw suggests that the NCAA is subject to the
useless because, while failing to prevent men from playing for pay, they breed
deceit and hypocrisy.
R. TELANDER, THE HUNDRED YARD LIE 43 (1989) (citing an article from 1915 in THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY by William T. Foster).
54. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1149.
55. Id. at 1148. The NCAA cited Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 493, for the proposition
that, "[t]he end sought [by these laws] was the prevention of the restraints to free competition in businesses and commercial transactions .
56. Id. at 1148.
57. 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
58. Id. (quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1969)).
59. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959).

60. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
61. The proscriptions of the Act, tailored as they are for the business world, are
not at all appropriate for application in the political area . . . all of this caution
would go for naught if we permitted an extension of the Sherman Act to regulate
activities of that nature simply because those activities have a commercial impact
Eastern R.R., 365 U.S. at 141.
62. The Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984) determined that the non-economic nature of the NCAA's self-regulation was relevant in determining whether the restraint in question violated the Sherman Act. It was not relevant in
applying the Sherman Act to the NCAA.
63. 356 F.2d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 1966).
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reach of section one of the Sherman Act. Indeed, the recent Justice Department inquiry into the practices of some private colleges and universities' in fixing tuition and financial aid levels for students further
supports the contention that the NCAA's actions would fall within the
ambit of the antitrust laws. 64
III.

STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Since it appears well-established that the NCAA is amenable to suit
under the antitrust laws, the question becomes how the rather vague
mandate of section one of the Sherman Act would be enforced against
the NCAA. 6 5 Two tests have traditionally been used by courts to evaluate restraints of trade under section one of the Sherman Act: The per se
test 6 6 and the rule of reason test. 67 Additionally, although per se language is used in some cases6 8 the court may have in reality utilized an
unarticulated rule of reason analysis. 69 This article will proceed to eval64. Justice Department officials said that educational institutions are exempt from
some provisions of the antitrust laws, but not from laws against price fixing. Price-Fixing
Inquiry at 20 Elite Colleges, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1989, at 1, col. 3. Irving Scher, a New York
attorney who heads the American Bar Association's antitrust section, is quoted as saying
that evidence of schools agreeing to financial aid packages or fixing tuition increases
"would be a traditional antitrust violation." U.S. Investigates Prestigious Universities, Colleges
for Possible Antitrust Violations, Wall St. J., Aug. 10, 1989, at B4, col. 4.
An earlier Wall Street Journal report called the schools "part of a price-fixing system
that OPEC might envy." Do Colleges Collude on FinancialAid?,Wall St.J., May 2, 1989, at BI,
col. 3. The fact that the Justice Department is investigating how prices are set in a field not
usually viewed as commercial may signal a more vigorous approach to antitrust enforcement. Although colleges and universities are not normally the sort of businesses regulated
by antitrust laws, they "are to some extent selling a product-education-with a price-tuition," said Phillip Areeda, an antitrust professor at Harvard Law School. Wall St.J., Aug.
10, 1989, at B4.
Questions have also been raised as to whether agreements to fix financial aid payments complied with the "Principles of Good Practice" of the National Association of College Admissions Counselors, a self-regulatory group to which most of the 23 schools being
investigated belong. Do Colleges Collude on FinancialAid?,Wall St.J., May 2, 1989, at BI, col.
3. Members of the group of 23 colleges have acknowledged that they have met annually
for the past 35 years to share information on applicants seeking financial aid. Barrett and
Chipello, at B4, col. 3. By comparison, the NCAA has much more of an appearance of a
classic cartel. The NCAA has existed since 1906, meets annually and has established elaborate written rules and requirements by which its members must abide, under the penalty
of serious sanctions. NCAA Guidefor the College-Bound Student-Athlete 1 (1989-90).
65. For an analysis of the application of antitrust laws to challenged restraints in general, see Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in ProfessionalSports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339, 34344.
66. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
68. This absence of a rigid delineation between per se and rule of reason analysis will
be addressed in the context of group boycotts, infra notes 112-135 and accompanying text.
However, according to a recent commentary on Preferred Provider Organizations, the "selection of the legal standard [per se or rule of reason] to be applied to a group boycott is
likely to determine the outcome of the controversy." Youle and Daw, Preferred Provider

Organizations: An Antitrust Perspective, 29 ANTITRUST

BULL.

301, 343 (1984).

69. One commentator has noted that, "[tlhere are cases where one can weigh the
harms, benefits, and alternatives and conclude almost instantaneously that conduct is unlawful; one decides the particular case so rapidly that he may express his result in 'per se'
language." P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS § 391(b)(2d ed. 1974).
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uate the Proposition 48 regulation under both a per se and a rule of
reason analysis.
A.

Per se Analysis

Certain types of agreements have been identified as being so unreasonable that they may be deemed illegal per se, without further inquiry
into their justification. One commentator has noted that "[b]ehavior is
illegal per se when the plaintiff need prove only that it occurred in order
to win his case, there being no other elements to the offense and no
allowable defense." ' 70 In Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, 7 1 the
Court stated:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
72
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
Justice Black, in Northern Pacific, noted that per se unreasonableness
avoids the necessity for "an incredibly complicated and prolonged eco73
nomic investigation" into the history of the industry involved.
Several practices have been identified by the courts as meriting per
se analysis. Among the practices which the courts have deemed per se
illegal are price fixing, 74 division of markets, 75 group boycotts, 76 and
77
tying arrangements.
B.

Rule of Reason Analysis

In Standard Oil v. United States, 78 Justice White set forth what has
become known as the "rule of reason." He wrote, "It]he criteria to be
resorted to in any given case for the purpose of ascertaining whether
violations of the section have been committed, is the rule of reason
70. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, at 18 (1978).
71. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
72. Id. at 5. See also Worthen Bank & Trust v. National BankAmericard, 485 F.2d 119
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).
73. 356 U.S. at 5.
74. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed ... with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging,
or stabilizing the price of a commodity . . . is illegal per se." Id at 223; United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). "Agreements which create such potential
power may well be held to be . . . unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry into whether a particular price is ... unreasonable ... ."ld. at 397.
See also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons Inc., 340 U.S.
211 (1951).
75. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
76. See infra notes 112-135 and accompanying text.
77. See Standard Oil v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949). "[T]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition." Id. at 305-06;
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); International Salt Co.,
Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
78. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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.... -79 Justice White also utilized the rule of reason analysis in United

States v. American Tobacco Co.,80 where he defined a restraint of trade as a
restraint which, "[o]nly embraced acts or contracts or agreements or
combinations which operated . . .by unduly restricting competition or

unduly obstructing the due course of trade, or which, either because of
their inherent nature or effect or because of the evident purpose of the
81
acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade."
In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 8 2 the rule of reason standard was further delineated. Justice Brandeis wrote, "the true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." 8 3 The factors to be considered
when applying the rule of reason analysis are: The facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied, its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed, the nature of the restraint, the history of the
restraint, and the reason for adopting the remedy. 84 Thus, the rule of
reason standard is a malleable concept which courts must mold to conform to each individual fact situation. More recently, the focus of the
courts in rule of reason cases has been on the procompetitive effects of
85
the restraint. In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,
the Court cited the test espoused in Standard Oil, which asked whether
the challenged agreements or acts "were unreasonably restrictive of
competitive decisions." '8 6 Unreasonableness could be based on either
the nature or character of the agreements or on the surrounding circumstances. 87 Thus, the inquiry focused on the impact of the restraint on
competitive conditions.
In ProfessionalEngineers, the Court stated that "the inquiry mandated
by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that
promotes competition or one that suppresses competition." ' 88 Therefore, the competitive effect of an agreement is evaluated by "analyzing
the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the
reasons why it was imposed." 89 Thus, the Court will balance the anticompetitive effects of the restraint against any procompetitive benefits
associated therewith. In recent years, however, there seems to have
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 62.
221 U.S. 106 (1911).
Id. at 179.
246 U.S. 231 (1918).
Id. at 238.
See Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 615 (1953), which

states that the factors to be considered should include "the percentage of business con-

trolled, the strength of the remaining competition [and] whether the action springs from
business requirements or purpose to monopolize."
85. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
86. Id.
87. Id.

88. Id. at 691. See also Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165
(9th Cir. 1966). "The pertinent inquiry .. .is whether an association intends to use that
power in a manner which tends to suppress or destroy competition." Id. at 171.

89. 435 U.S. at 692.
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been a blurring of the clear, bright line distinctions between the per se
and rule of reason tests. In Professional Engineers, the Supreme Court
noted that the purpose of either a per se or rule of reason analysis is "to
form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint." 90
In another industry heavily dependent upon agreements among
would-be competitors, a rule of reason analysis was deemed appropriate
by the Supreme Court. In BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.,91 the plain92
tiff, CBS, sought a license on a per-use basis from two organizations
which acted as clearinghouses for their members. When the organizations refused the license CBS sued, alleging price-fixing under the Sherman Act. The sole issue before the Court was whether the blanket
license arrangement of the two organizations was properly within the
94
per se category, 9 3 as held by the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court ruled that the blanket license was not a "naked
restraint of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition."-95
Even though the "per se rule is a valid and useful tool of antitrust policy
and enforcement,"' 96 the licensing arrangement "should be subjected to
a more discriminating examination under the rule of reason."' 97 In explaining its decision to apply a rule of reason analysis, the Court noted
that "[t]here are situations in which competitors have been permitted to
form joint selling agencies or other pooled activities, subject to strict
"98
limitations under the antitrust laws .
C.

Sports Cases

In NCAA v. Board of Regents, 99 the Supreme Court discussed what
would be considered "procompetitive" for the purpose of applying the
test espoused in ProfessionalEngineers. 10 0 Justice Stevens found that the
NCAA may be viewed as procompetitive since its role of preserving the
quality of amateur athletics widens consumer choice. Similarly, in Smith
v. Pro Football, Inc., 10 the court of appeals noted that "under the rule of
reason, a restraint must be evaluated to determine whether it is significantly anticompetitive in purpose or effect."' 1 2 If the restraint is found
90.

Id.

91. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
92. The organizations involved were the American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers ("ASCAP"), and Broadcast Music, Inc., ("BMI").
93.

Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 4.

94. CBS, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977).
95. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253, 263 (1963)).
96. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 8.
97. Id. at 24.
98. Id. at 14 (quoting Memorandum for United States as Amicus Curiaeon Pet. for Cert.
in K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., O.T. 1967, No. 147, at 10-11) (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U.S. 344 (1933); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); United
States v. St. Louis Terminal, 224 U.S. 383 (1912)).
99. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
100. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
101. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
102. Id. at 1183.
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to have "legitimate business purposes" which promote competition, the
"anticompetitive evils" of the challenged practice must be carefully bal0 3
anced against its "procompetitive virtues."'
From the Proposition 48 challenger's perspective, there would be
several advantages of a per se analysis over a rule of reason analysis.
First, the per se test is a bright line test which judges can apply. Conversely, the rule of reason test requires a certain amount of judicial
discretion in determining reasonableness, which may result in consideration of a myriad of differing factors as to what restraints are reasonable.
In Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.,' 0 4 Judge Ferguson wrote,
"the Supreme Court has on numerous occasions recognized these difficulties and has declared that with regard to certain practices the
problems of making adequate economic determinations and setting appropriate guidelines are so complex that they simply outweigh the very
limited benefits deriving from those practices ....
115 Second, from
the Proposition 48 challenger's perspective, there is an economy and
efficiency justification for applying a per se test when warranted by the
facts and circumstances of a given case. Time problems, court costs and
burdens on the judicial system are minimized with a per se analysis. The
Denver Rockets court stated that "[tihe primary disadvantages of the rule
of reason are that it requires difficult and lengthy factual inquiries and
very subjective policy decisions which are in many ways essentially legis'06
lative and ill-suited to the judicial process."'
In the case of a Proposition 48 player who would lose one year of
eligibility under the rule, application of the per se test would be necessary for the player to obtain a quick and meaningful remedy. The time
required by a rule of reason analysis would effectively eliminate the
Proposition 48 player's ability to overturn the regulation in the one year
time period during which he is barred from competition. In Denver Rockets, player Spencer Haywood challenged the National Basketball Association's ("NBA") restriction which purportedly made Haywood ineligible
to enter the NBA until four years after his high school class graduation.
Haywood sought to enter the NBA after his second year of college basketball, and eventually received partial summary judgment to permit
him to do so, with the court acknowledging the extreme time delay of an
extended rule of reason analysis. 10 7 The time delays involved in a challenge to Proposition 48 under a rule of reason analysis would militate
strongly in favor of a per se analysis; time is of the essence to the Proposition 48 challenger.
The Proposition 48 challenger would most likely seek an injunction,
thus allowing the athlete to compete during that school year. Injunctive
relief or summary judgment is preferable for the athlete challenging
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 1183. See alsoKapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
Id. at "1063.
Id.
Id. at 1058-59.
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Proposition 48 because money damages for the loss of one year of competition may ultimately be difficult to ascertain. Commenting on the difficulty of computing damages in antitrust cases, the Supreme Court has
observed that "damage issues in these cases are rarely susceptible of the
kind of concrete, detailed proof of injury which is available in other contexts." 1 08 A federal appeals court in a sports case has noted the "Alicein-Wonderland" quality of the computation of antitrust damages.' 0 9
Therefore, because of the substantial delays involved in a rule of reason
analysis and the inherent difficulty in ascertaining money damages for a
player prohibited from competing under Proposition 48, application of
the per se standard and injunctive relief are preferred remedies from the
Proposition 48 challenger's perspective.
Judge Ferguson in Denver Rockets applied the following traditional
criteria to determine that granting an injunction was appropriate given
the defendants' illegal per se conduct:"I 0
A preliminary injunction in this type of action should be
granted where the plaintiff shows that: (1) the conduct to be
enjoined is in furtherance of the alleged violation of the antitrust laws; (2) there is a substantial likelihood the allegations of
the complaint will be sustained at the trial of the cause; (3) that
irreparable harm to the plaintiff will result if the injunction
pendente lite is denied; and (4) that there is no conduct by the
plaintiff which would bar the granting of equitable relief. I '
Under a Denver Rockets analysis, a Proposition 48 challenger would have
to meet all of the above criteria to be granted an injunction to strike
down Proposition 48 and to be permitted to compete.
IV.
A.

GROUP BoYcor-rs

Generally

The NCAA's establishment of Proposition 48 restrictions is susceptible to Sherman Act attack as a group boycott. A group boycott, also
known as a concerted refusal to deal, 1 2 is a situation where commercial
entities agree to refuse to deal with another entity in order to influence
improperly the latter's business practices. Classic group boycotts have
historically been susceptible to a per se analysis." 3 Although there may
108. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969).
109. Smith v. Pro Football Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
110. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1061. Judge Ferguson noted that, "[s]ummary
judgments have been frequently used by courts in group boycott cases." See, e.g., Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
111. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1058..
112. W. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW - HANDBOOK, (1987). "The term group boycott generally connotes a refusal to deal or an inducement of others not to deal or have business
relations .... "Id. at 101. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 618 (1976) (citing Kalinowski,

The Per-Se Doctrine - An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 2 UCLA L. REV. 569, 580 n.49
(1964)).
113. "[C]ases adopting a per se rule typically involve a "classic group boycott," i.e., a
"concerted attempt by competitiors at one level to protect themselves from non-group
members who seek to compete at that level." Youle and Daw, Preferred Provider Organizations: An Antitrust Perspective, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 301, 345 (1984). See Klor's, Inc. v. Broad-
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be a blurring of the distinction between the per se and rule of reason
tests, in general, where the boycott is "manifestly anticompetitive" or a
"naked restraint" of trade,' 14 an application of a per se test may still be
appropriate. These concerted refusals to deal involve attempts to gain
market power at the expense of other competitors. 1 5 However, one
commentator has noted that certain refusals to deal, primarily in areas
such as scheduling, are necessary in certain circumstances involving
sports leagues.' 16
In E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. ConsolidatedAir Tour Manual Commission," 7 the court identified three categories of per se illegal group boycotts. The first group consisted of horizontal combinations among
traders at one level of distribution whose purpose was to exclude direct
competitors from the market." 8 The second group consisted of vertical
combinations among traders at different levels who excluded direct
competitors from the market." 19 The third group was comprised of
combinations designed to influence coercively the trade practices of
20
boycott victims, rather than to eliminate them as competitors.'
Several cases established that the per se test was appropriate in the
group boycott area. In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 12 1 Klor's alleged that Broadway-Hale and other manufacturers had agreed not to
way-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941).
114. Careful scrutiny of the facts and circumstances surrounding a particular refusal to deal is helpful in predicting the legal standards that will be applied.
Where a refusal to deal is used to implement an illegal restraint of trade which
itself would be subjected to per se analysis, the arrangement is also likely to be
judged by the per se standard. Thus, a refusal to deal designed to promote a
price-fixing scheme, eliminate discounting competitors, allocate markets dealing
contracts, or create monopoly power will be struck down without inquiry as to its
effect upon competition in the relevant market.
Youle and Daw, at 344.
115. But see Business Elecs. Corp., v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988)(holding that a vertical restraint was not per se illegal unless it included some agreement on
price or price levels); FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986)(discussing the Court's reluctance to extend per se analysis where the economic impact of the
restraint is not immediately obvious). See also Northwest Wholesale Stationer's, Inc. v.
Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985)(where the Supreme Court held
that it was not per se illegal for a group of retailers to expel a competing retailer because
the plaintiff had failed to show that the defendant possessed market power or control of a
vital service or product needed to compete effectively).
116. Agreements to refuse to deal are essential to the effectiveness and sometimes
to the existence of many wholly beneficial economic activities. All league sports
from the Ivy League to the National Football League . . . rest entirely upon the
right to boycott .... Members of the league agree not to play with nonmembers
or to limit the number of games with nonmembers. Were leagues denied the
power to enforce such agreements . . . the league would be destroyed.
R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 322 (1978).
117. 467 F.2d 178, 186 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973).
118. See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914).
119. See Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
120. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). See also
Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973). See infra
notes 172-82 and accompanying text, in which the Blalock case is analogized to the third
category of group boycotts, as exemplified in Fashion Originators'.
121. 359 U.S. 207, 209 (1959).
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sell to Klor's or to sell to Klor's only on unfavorable terms. The
Supreme Court held that "[g]roup boycotts, or concerted refusals by
traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden [per se] category."' 12 2 In Klor's, the Court found a wide combination of manufacturers, distributors, and a retailer which took away
from Klor's its freedom to operate in an open, competitive market, and
23
thus interfered with the natural flow of commerce.'
The Supreme Court did not accept the defendants' argument that
the boycott should be tolerated because the victim's business was so
small as to make little difference to the economy.' 2 4 In the case of a
prospective college student-athlete challenging Proposition 48, it is
plausible that the NCAA would argue that the Proposition 48 student's
non-participation in athletics for a one year period would have little effect on the overall economy. However, if one follows the Kor's approach, this makes no difference. It is the "nature," "character," and
"monopolistic tendency" of the interface with interstate commerce
which matter. 12 5 Similarly, in another group boycott case, Fashion Originators'Guildof America v. FTC,' 2 6 the Supreme Court refused to hear evidence of the reasonableness of the methods used by the defendants.
The Court ruled that the Fashion Originators' Guild's plan to sell only
to retailers who would not deal in copied garments was an unreasonable
restraint of trade. The plan narrowed the outlets to which manufacturers could sell and from which retailers could buy; it subjected all retailers and manufacturers who decline to comply with the plan to an
organized boycott; it stripped members of freedom of action, and it had
12 7
as its "purpose and effect the direct suppression of competition."'
It was not required that a complete monopoly be achieved, because
"it is sufficient if it really tends to that end and to deprive[s] the public
of the advantages which flow from free competition."' 128 The purpose
and object of the combination, its potential power, its tendency toward
monopoly, and the coercion it practiced upon a rival method of competition, all brought the combination within the proscriptions of the Sherman . . . Act."' 12 9 The Court refused to hear evidence offered of
0
reasonableness. 13

In drawing an analogy between Fashion Originators' and Proposition
48, it is apparent that Proposition 48 also narrows the pool from which
122. Klor's Inc., 359 U.S. at 212. See also Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951); Binderup v. Pathe Exch.,
Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealer's Ass'n v. United States,
234 U.S. 600 (1914).
123. Klor's, 359 U.S. at 213.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941).
127. Id.at 465.
128. Id. at 466 (quoting United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895).
129. Id. at 467-68.
130. Id. at 468.
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Division I and II colleges can recruit athletically eligible freshmen and it
narrows the choice of schools which those students may attend if they
wish to participate in intercollegiate athletics during their first year. The
plan subjects all students who fail to qualify under Propositin 48 to an
organized group boycott by all NCAA Division I and II schools with regard to the student's participation in intercollegiate athletics during the
first year, and it restrains the universities' ability to place on their intercollegiate teams certain students already admitted to the school under
the school's independent admission standards. Overall, the plan has the
purpose and effect of direct suppression of competition. It suppresses
both the student's freedom to attend and to compete athletically at the
school to which he or she has been admitted, and the school's freedom
to allow its students to compete. Furthermore, the NCAA's Proposition
48 exclusively affects athletes. A non-athlete student who has not met
the Proposition 48 standards could still participate in other school-sponsored activities, but the student-athlete who has not met the Proposition
48 standards is prevented from athletic participation by the NCAA
rule. 131
An exception to the rule of per se analysis for group boycotts was
enunciated in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange. 132 The Silver Court held
that the concerted action of the New York Stock Exchange constituted a
group boycott which was per se illegal, but because of the other statutory scheme at issue, the Securities and Exchange Act, the Court did not
end the inquiry there. 13 3 Instead, the Court created an exception to the
per se rule of group boycotts when a statutory scheme of self-regulation
is involved. When such a scheme exists, it will result in a rule of reason
inquiry.' 3 4 The Court reasoned that certain organizations need to develop internal guidelines to promote safety rules and rules to ensure the
integrity of competition and to provide for orderly execution. However,
Silver may have limited applicability in the sports law context since
35
sports cases may not fall within the Silver exception. 1
B.

Sports Cases
A body of caselaw has developed pertaining to the application of
131.

William V. Muse, the president of the University of Akron, advocates requiring

that each school treat athletes the same way it treats other students as to admission and
retention standards and eligibility for participation in extracurricular activities. He has
written that, "[w]e should not prohibit freshmen from competing in athletics unless we are
also willing to prohibit them from playing in the band, holding office in student government, pledging a fraternity or holding a part-time job." Muse, in a letter to the editor
printed in SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 18, 1989, at 5, col. 3.
132. 373 U.S. 341 (1963). Silver involved the question of whether and to what extent
the federal antitrust laws apply to securities exchanges regulated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 342. The antitrust claim in Silver alleged that the New York
Stock Exchange had conspired with its member firms to deprive petitioners of their private
wire connections and stock ticker service in violation of sections one and two of the Sherman Act. Id. at 345-46.
133. Id. at 347-49.
134. Id. at 360-61.

135. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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per se and rule of reason analysis to sports cases.1 36We will analyze the
Proposition 48 restriction under both guidelines.
1. Per Se Illegality
Several sports cases have applied the per se standard to group boycotts. In Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., t37 the court ruled that
the NBA's bylaws prohibiting a player from negotiation with an NBA
team until four years after his high school class graduation constituted a
group boycott which was illegal per se.
Spencer Haywood was an accomplished high school All-American
basketball player. After two years of college basketball, Haywood entered into a contract under which he later refused to perform with the
Denver Rockets of the American Basketball Association ("ABA").' 3 8
Haywood next entered into a contract with the Seattle Supersonics of
the NBA. However, NBA Bylaw 2.05139 made a player ineligible to
compete in the NBA until four years after his high school class had graduated.14 0 Haywood contended that Bylaw 2.05 constituted an unlawful
restraint of trade in violation of sections one and two of the Sherman
Act. 141
The Denver Rockets court identified two threshold elements which
must be present before a concerted refusal to deal can be illegal under
section one of the Sherman Act:
(1) There must be some effect on "trade or commerce
among the several States," and
(2) there must be sufficient agreement
to constitute a
42
"contract, combination ...

or conspiracy."'

136. See generally Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 339, 344-51.
137. 325 F. Supp. at 1053.
138. Haywood alleged that the Denver Rockets made fraudulent misrepresentations to
him. Id. at 1054.
139. A person who has not completed high school or who has completed high
school but has not entered college, shall not be eligible to be drafted or to be a
Player [in the NBA] until four years after he has been graduated or four years
after his original high school class has been graduated, as the case may be, nor
may the future services of any such person be negotiated or contracted for, or
otherwise reserved. Similarly, a person who has entered college but is no longer
enrolled, shall not be eligible to be drafted or to be a Player until the time when
he would have first become eligible had he remained enrolled in college. Any
negotiations or agreements with any such person during such period shall be null
and void and shall confer no rights to the services of such person at any time
thereafter.
NBA BYLAws § 2.05 reprinted in Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1055.
140. In 1958, this restriction precluded Wilt Chamberlain from entering the NBA draft
after his junior year of college, when he chose not to play during his senior year at the
University of Kansas. Because of the NBA's restriction, Chamberlain could not enter the
NBA in 1958. He toured, instead, that season with the Harlem Globetrotters. See W.
CHAMBERLAIN & D. SHAW, WILT 93 (1973).
14 1. This article will deal with only the section one allegations made in Denver Rockets
v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
142. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1062. The NCAA has been called a "price fixing
cartel that limits payments to athletes." McCormick & Meiners, Sacred Cows, Competition,
and Racial Discrimination, NEW PERSPECTIVES 47 (Winter 1988).
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It was uncontested in Denver Rockets that both of these elements were
present. Likewise, the elements are present in the case of the NCAA and
Proposition 48. The NCAA schedules games in various states and receives television and radio revenue from the nationwide broadcasting of
those games, thus constituting interstate commerce. Also, through the
application of Proposition 48, the member institutions of the NCAA
have agreed not to permit the students affected by Proposition 48 to
compete.
The Denver Rockets court ruled that "[t]here is a substantial probability ... that NBA By-law 2.05 constitutes a group boycott as defined
in Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. .... .,143 But for the by-law provision, Haywood would have been eligible to play in the NBA.' 4 4 Similarly, the college student barred by Proposition 48 would be eligible, but
for the NCAA rule, to play collegiate athletics for a Division I or II
school to which admission had been granted. The Denver Rockets court
considered By-law 2.05 to be a "restraint upon free trade in interstate
commerce (in the form of an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction of
the ability of qualified basketball players to bargain freely in a competitive market)...
145
The court labeled the NBA rule "a 'primary' concerted refusal to
deal wherein the actors at one level of a trade pattern (NBA team members) refuse to deal with an actor at another level (those ineligible [for
the NBA draft under the] rule)."1 46 In the case of Proposition 48, the
refusal to deal is between actors at one level, NCAA Division I and II
schools, and actors at another level, college students. Thus, a court examining Proposition 48, citing the analysis in Denver Rockets, could also
47
find a primary concerted refusal to deal.'
The Denver Rockets court identified three instances of harm resulting
from such a boycott. First, the victim is injured by being unable to
enter the market he seeks. Second, competition in the market in which
the victim attempts to enter is injured. Third, the individual members of
the NBA have established their own private government by pooling their
143. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1056.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1057.
146. Id. at 1061.
147. Even prior to the Denver Rockets case, a suit was filed against the NBA, alleging a
group boycott for the League's failure to permit a player to compete. See Hawkins v. NBA,
288 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Pa. 1968)(civil antitrust action); Hawkins v. NBA, 295 F. Supp. 103
(W.D. Pa. 1969)(private antitrust action). In 1966, attorneys for basketball player, Connie
Hawkins, filed an antitrust suit against the NBA, claiming that, as the only major league in
professional basketball, the NBA possessed a monopoly on all jobs in the field. D. WOLF,
FOUL! 302 (1972). Hawkins alleged that the NBA teams and the League, through the
Commissioner, had conspired to blacklist Hawkins in restraint of trade and in violation of
Federal antitrust laws. Id. at 302-03. Until that time, "no one had ever applied the principal of group boycott to a sports case." D. WOLF, FOUL! 303 (quoting Roslyn Litman, attorney for Connie Hawkins).
Hawkins v. NBA was eventually settled before it reached trial. Hawkins was admitted
into the NBA, and he received a substantial monetary settlement. D. WOLF, FOUL! at 34445.
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economic power. 148 With Proposition 48, all three instances of harm
are present. The college student is injured by being unable to play his
sport for a Division I or II school for the period specified by Proposition
48. Overall competition in college athletics is hurt because of the absence of Proposition 48 players. Finally, the individual members of the
NCAA have, in effect, established their own private government which
allows them to exclude players at will. It is noteworthy that the court
ruled as it did in Denver Rockets even though the employment option of
the ABA was open to Spencer Haywood,' 49 just as the option of attending a non-Division I or non-Division II school is available to the Proposi150
tion 48 student.
The argument that the Silver exception' 5 1 should be extended to
professional sports was rejected in Denver Rockets. 15 2 The court ruled
that the case did not fall within the rule of reason exception provided by
Silver, since the NBA by-laws contained no provision for a hearing
before the provision in question was applied to exclude an individual
player. Since there was also no provision for a player to petition for an
appeal, the court concluded that the NBA rules in question "fall outside
the Silver exception and are subject to the per se rule normally applicable to group boycotts."' 153 Similarly, the same argument could be made
for the Proposition 48 student who has no individual right to seek an
exception to the application of Proposition 48 to him; 15 4 there are no
provisions for a hearing or an appeal contained in Proposition 48, so,
therefore, the Silver exception would not apply.
Some similarities to the Denver Rockets case can also be seen in Gardella v. Chandler,15 5 where the plaintiff, a professional baseball player,
violated the terms of the reserve clause of his major league baseball contract by playing professional baseball in Mexico while under contract to
the New York Giants. He sought to return to major league baseball, was
subsequently banned from organized league baseball in the United
States for five years, and was thus "deprived pro tanto of his means of
livelihood."' 1 56 Gardella filed an antitrust suit under the Sherman and
Clayton Acts. 15 7 The case was dismissed by the district court.' 5 8
148. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1061.
149.

The ABA had no counterpart to By-law 2.05 of the NBA.

150. While it is true that Division III and junior colleges are available alternatives for
Proposition 48 students, they do not offer the same level of exposure and competition for
the athlete. The money spent on athletics and the media exposure a player receives at a
non-Division I school are not comparable to that of a Division I school.
151. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
152. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
153. Id.
154. Any application for a waiver of the applicability of Proposition 48 to a particular
student must be made by the institution, and only after the student has already enrolled at
the institution.
155. 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
156. Id. at 403.
157. A major portion of the opinion in Gardella v. Chandler, 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) was devoted to an analysis of whether baseball constituted interstate commerce.
That issue is no longer in question. The inapplicability of the Sherman Act was enunciated in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Base-
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In a two-to-one decision remanding the case,' 59 Judge Frank referred to the "involuntary character of the servitude which is imposed
upon players by the strength of the combination controlling the labor of
practically all of the players in the country."' 160 Likewise, in the case of
Proposition 48, the member institutions of the NCAA control the labor,
albeit noncompensatory labor,16' of virtually all of the prospective pro62
fessional basketball players in the country.1
In Gardella, Judge Frank also wrote that:
ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); see also Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356
(1953). In Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972), the Court found that "professional
baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce .... With its reserve system
enjoying exemption from the federal antitrust laws, baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an
exception and an anomaly. Federal Baseball and Toolson have become an aberration confined to baseball." Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. We cite Gardella for the limited purpose of
showing how a person, such as the Major League Baseball Commissioner, or a group, such
as the NCAA, can illegally inhibit and restrain a player's right to compete.
158. See Gardella v. Chandler, 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
159. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sent the case back to the district
court for a trial on the merits of the complaint, but the case was settled and Gardella was
reinstated before the trial. L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW, 18-19 (1977).
160. Gardella, 172 F.2d at 410.
161. William Gerberding, president of the University of Washington, has questioned
the wisdom and necessity of the existing regulatory structure which prohibits college athletes from receiving compensation.
At the core of the existing regulatory structure is the idea that having college
athletes 'play for pay' is obviously wrong for society and wrong for them. I'm less
and less sure about such matters, and I'm even less sure as I contemplate the
obvious facts that so many of the most gifted athletes are economically and educationally disadvantaged blacks. I have become increasingly uncomfortable about
the defensibility of a largely white establishment's maintaining an elaborate system of rules that deprive black students athletes of adequate financial support in
the name of 'the ideals of amateurism'... Why should a talented flute player be
able to receive a music scholarship and also be able to help make his or her way
through college by playing in jazz and classical groups for pay, while a person
whose gifts are athletic and whose gifts help sustain expensive intercollegiate programs school should not be able to model T-shirts or sell cars on play his or her
sport in the summer for money or -perish the thought -join a national union of
collegiate players who bargain collectively with universities regarding their financial support?
College Sports: Maybe They Should Play For Pay, Wash. Post, Sept. 5, 1989, at A19, col. 1.
162. See Frank Deford, Remarks at the House Education and Labor Subcommittee
hearing (May 18, 1989), quoted in End Athletic Scholarships, Shorten Seasons, Educator Urges,
Detroit News, May 18, 1989, at IA. "[B]ig-time college athletics has always been a scandal
and always will be, unless major changes are made. It is a professional game that poses as
amateur; a big business that uses free labor". College coaches, on the other hand, seem to
be rewarded very handsomely for their involvement with their athletic programs. In accordance with the 1989-90 NCAA Manual, coaches may be compensated for endorsing
products and may receive "direct cash payment in recognition of a specific and extraordinary achievement (e.g ...
winning a conference or national championship.)." NCAA
MANUAL § 11.3.2.3. (1989-90).
It is estimated that Tom Davis, head basketball coach at the University of Iowa, receives an overall income package of at least $250,000. SalariesJust Part of Package, Cedar
Rapids Gazette, May 3, 1989 at 7A, cols. 1-4. Lute Olson, head basketball coach at the
University of Arizona, has reportedly signed a new contract package worth at least
$400,000 per year. Id. Bill Frieder, head basketball coach at Arizona State University, is
reportedly receiving $700,000 per year guaranteed income. College Coaches' BriefEncounters,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1989, at A31, col. 3. Rick Pitino recently left the New York Knicks of
the NBA to accept the head coaching job at the University of Kentucky, a school which is
on NCAA probation, for a reported $5 million over seven years. Pitino Feels at Home in
Kentucky, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1989, at B12, col. 1.
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[T]he most extreme of these penalties is the blacklisting [for
violation of the reserve clause] of the player so that no club in
organized baseball will hire him . . . [tihe right to play with
organized baseball is indispensable to the career of a professional baseball player. The violator may perhaps become ... a
bartender or a streetsweeper, but his 6 chances
of ever again
3
playing baseball are exceedingly slim.1
Similarly, Proposition 48 is a form of blacklisting for college basketball
players. They are declared ineligible for one year and forever branded
with the Proposition 48 label. Indeed, the "right to play" organized Division I or II college basketball is the normal course of preparation for
the athlete seeking a career in professional basketball. It is quite possible that substantial harm could be inflicted upon an athlete's professional career by virtue of the one year ban Proposition 48. The clubs of
the NBA, after Denver Rockets, may draft or sign a player after his high
school class has graduated or after any year of collegiate play. 164 Even
the NFL has now allowed undergraduates in the draft. 16 5 If a player is
prevented from competing during his freshman year, he may lose certain leverage and marketability in the highly competitive market for professional basketball players. 166 Also, the specter of injury looms large; a
163. Gardella, 172 F.2d at 410.
164. The NBA rule is as follows: "A person whose high school class has graduated
shall become eligible to be selected in a College Draft if he renounces his intercollegiate
basketball eligibility by written notice to the NBA at least forty-five (45) days prior to such
draft." 1988 Collective Bargaining Agreement between the National Basketball Association and the National Basketball Players Association, Art. IV, § 1 (h) (Nov. 1988).
For example, Ralph Sampson, a former player for the University of Virginia, was a
much sought-after player after his freshman, sophomore and junior years of college and
was eventually drafted after his senior year. Michael Jordan, a former player for the University of North Carolina, was drafted after his junior year, before his college eligibility
expired. In his freshman year, Jordan's game winning shot helped the University of North
Carolina defeat Georgetown for the National championship. Indeed, after Denver Rockets,
several players, such as Moses Malone and Darryl Dawkins, entered professional basketball
directly from high school. In 1989, Jay Edwards of Indiana University, J.R. Reid of the
University of North Carolina, and Nick Anderson of the University of Illinois were among
those who entered the NBA draft before they had completed four years of collegiate
basketball.
165. The NFL recently allowed 1988 Heisman Trophy winner Barry Sanders of
Oklahoma State to be eligible for the 1989 NFL draft, even though he had collegiate eligibility remaining. The NFL ostensibly carved out an exception for Sanders, based on a
statement by NFL spokesman Joe Browne. He stated that:
We've always believed it best for both professional and college football that the
NFL's eligibility rules not work to disrupt college programs or players' educational opportunities. But when an underclassman whose program is under NCAA
sanctions decides to turn pro with the full support of his college coach and athletic director and when he has lost any remaining college football eligibility in the
process, we have no realistic choice but to accept him.
Indianapolis Star, April 5, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
The NFL has revised eligibility procedures for the 1990 college draft. College players
may now enter the draft, if three years have elapsed since their high school graduation.
Big TV Deals will be at Top of Agenda when NFL. Owners Meet Sunday, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9,
1990, at 13B, col. 2.
166. However, some athletes who have lost a year of eligibility to Proposition 48 feel
that they have benefitted academically and personally. Terry Mills, of the University of
Michigan basketball team, is quoted as stating that losing his freshman year of eligibility
under Proposition 48 has helped him adjust to college life and has placed him on track to
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longer college career heightens
the prospects of a career-threatening or
67
career-ending injury. 1
The per se rule has been applied elsewhere in the sports law context. In Washington State Bowling ProprietorsAssociation v. Pacific Lanes, Inc.,
the court invalidated a regulatory plan by the Bowling Proprietors Association by applying a per se rule.' 6 8 In doing so, the court reiterated
that "group boycotts are per se violations of the Sherman Act."'1 6 9 The
court also specifically rejected the notion that only commercial boycotts
receive the per se standard.17 0 In response to the defense that the association's restrictions were intended to promote the sport, a defense the
NCAA would be likely to make in defending Proposition 48 from antitrust challenge, the court held that "[s]uch circumstances do notjustify a
private association passing regulations to deal with the problem when
their effect is to restrain or regulate interstate commerce." 71
Another sports case has also applied a per se rule to professional
athletics. In Blalock v. Ladies ProfessionalGolf Association, 172 Blalock, a professional golfer, filed an antitrust action against the defendant organization alleging a violation of section one of the Sherman Act. By decision
of the executive board of the Ladies Professional Golf Association, composed of Blalock's fellow competitors, Blalock was fined and suspended
for cheating. The court first determined that the two threshold elements discussed in Denver Rockets 173 were also present in the Blalock
case. 174 Interstate commerce was present and the defendants had an
75
agreement to refuse to deal with the plaintiff. 1
The Blalock court cited E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air
Tour, ManufacturingCo. ,176 for the proposition that there are three types
of per se illegal group boycotts. 177 The McQuade court concluded that
the "touchstone of per se illegality has been the purpose and effect
of the arrangement in question."' 178 The per se rule has been applied
graduate in four years. Mills: From Prop 48 to Hometown Hero, Detroit Free Press, Nov. 22,
1989, at 7D, col. 2.
167. Witness Danny Manning, who considered but rejected turning professional after
his junior year at the University of Kansas, only to suffer a severe knee injury in his first
year of professional basketball. In the words of the poet Robert Herrick, "Gather ye
rosebuds while ye may." Herrick, To The Virgins, To Make Much of Time.
168. 356 F.2d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966). In Denver
Rockets, 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 1971), the court distinguishes the per se violation in Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371
(9th Cir. 1966) from the ruling of no violation in Deesen v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 358
F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966). The explanation given for the

differing results reached in the two cases involved the hearing and procedural safeguards
present in Deesen but not present in Washington State Bowling.
169. Washington State Bowling, 356 F.2d at 376.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
173. See supra notes 104-111 and accompanying text.
174. Blalock, 359 F. Supp. at 1263.
175. Id.
176. 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973).
177. Blalock, 359 F. Supp. at 1264.
178. E.A. McQuade Tours, 467 F.2d at 187.
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to exclusionary or coercive conduct which is a "naked restraint of
trade."179 Using this as a basis, the Blalock court concluded that the purpose and effect of the defendants' agreement to suspend the plaintiff for
one year was to exclude the plaintiff from the market and was therefore
a "naked restraint of trade" and "tantamount to total exclusion from the
market." 18 0

Given the willingness of some courts to apply a per se analysis to
group boycotts in certain situations, the group boycott as exemplified by
Proposition 48 might also receive per se treatment and/or summary
judgment. Summary judgments "have been frequently used by the
courts in group boycott cases." 18 1 Also, "[s]ummary judgment for violations of the antitrust laws is proper where less restrictive means than
those used could have been employed." 18 2 Following prior caselaw, the
per se test may be appropriate for Proposition 48.
2.

Rule of Reason

If, however, the per se test is not applied, a rule of reason test
would likely be used.' 8 3 Under the rule of reason test, the Proposition
48 athlete would seem to have a substantial chance of prevailing. Since
the Proposition 48 athlete is denied the opportunity to compete, it is
highly unlikely that such a practice could be deemed by a court to be
"procompetitive."
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 1 84 the Society's rules prohibited its members from submitting
competitive bids for engineering services. The Society argued that in
attempting to set fees it was preventing the public harm which unrestrained competition would produce.' 8 5 The Supreme Court applied
the rule of reason in analyzing the restraint.
179. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, 334 (1978). "Since the naked boycott is a
form of predatory behavior, there is little doubt that it should be a per se violation of the
Sherman Act."
180. Blalock, 359 F. Supp. at 1265. The court cited the "completely unfettered, subjective discretion" of the defendants and the fact that the suspension was imposed by competitors of the plaintiff as reasons for its decision. Id. But cf.Molinas v. NBA, 190 F. Supp.
2411 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Defendant sued the NBA and its member teams for damages for
alleged violations of the antitrust laws after Molinas had been indefinitely suspended by
the league for gambling. The court held that the suspension of Molinas was proper and
not an unreasonable restraint of trade because Molinas was suspended pursuant to both a

clause in his contract and a league rule prohibiting gambling.
181. See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp 1049, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1971) which noted that
group boycotts were specifically mentioned by the Supreme Court as one type of case
which was appropriate for resolution without trial, and that partial summary judgment is
appropriate in antitrust cases. See also White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 260
(1963); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 3 F.R.D. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Bla-

lock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1262 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
182. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066. See also International Salt Co. v. United

States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947); International Business Machines Corp. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936).
183. But see Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066, which ruled that the case did not fall
within the rule of reason exception provided by Silver, supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.

184. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
185. id. at 687.
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The ProfessionalEngineers Court cited the test set out in Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 18 6 asking whether the challenged contracts or acts
"were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions." Unreasonableness could be based on either the nature or character of the contracts
or on the surrounding circumstances.' 8 7 Thus, the inquiry focused on
the impact of the restraint on competitive conditions.
In Professional Engineers, the Court wrote that "[t]he inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one
that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition."' 188 In
NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Supreme Court discussed what would be
considered "procompetitive" for the purpose of applying the Professional
Engineers test. In Board of Regents, the plaintiff universities objected to the
NCAA's limitations on the number of football games broadcast on television and on the number of appearances by any one team. The Court
determined that "it would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule to this
case" because the Court believed that horizontal restraints on competition were essential if the product was to be available at all.18 9
However, the Court noted that "[ojur analysis of this case under the
Rule of Reason, of course, does not change the ultimate focus of our
inquiry."' 190 Although the Court declined to apply a strict per se test, it
did not require a detailed market analysis and proof of market power. '9 '
The Board of Regents Court quoted Professional Engineers for the view that
"no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticom92
petitive character of such an agreement."'
In Board of Regents, the Court stated that certain restrictions of the
NCAA can be viewed as procompetitive. 9 3
However, the Court rejected both of the NCAA's justifications supporting its restraints on television rights. In rejecting these arguments, the Supreme Court cited
Professional Engineers for the proposition that "the Rule of Reason does
not support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is
unreasonable." 194 The Court also rejected the NCAA argument that its
interest in maintaining competitive balance justified the regulation.' 9 5
Therefore, Proposition 48 is unlikely to be labeled as "procompetitive"
186. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
187. Id. at 58.
188. ProfessionalEng rs, 435 U.S. at 691. See also Deesen v. Professional Golfer's Ass'n of

America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966). "The pertinent inquiry ...is whether an association intends to use that power in a manner which tends to suppress or destroy competi-

tion."Id. at 171.
189. NCAA v. Board Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984).
190. Id. at 103.
191. Id. at 109.
192. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984) (quoting ProfessionalEngineers,

435 U.S. at 692).
193. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102. The Court, however, also discussed the "anticompetitive consequences" of the NCAA television arrangement and noted that
"[i]ndividual competitors lose their freedom to compete." Id. at 106.
194. Id. at 117 (quoting Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 696).
195. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117. See R. McCormick and R. Meiners, Sacred Cows,
Competition, and Racial Discrimination, NEW PERSPECTIVES, Winter 1988. "To allow athletic
conferences and independent schools to set their own standards for admission for athletes,
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under the ProfessionalEngineers test.196
In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,197 the court of appeals declined to apply
a per se rule to the NFL draft. The court noted that the hallmark of the
group boycott is the effort of competitors to "barricade themselves from
competition at their own level."' 98 The court differentiated the NFL
draft from the classic group boycott for two reasons. First, the court
said that the NFL clubs were not competitors in any economic sense, 19 9
because the clubs operate as a joint venture in the production of an entertainment product, football games and telecasts. 20 0 No NFL team can
produce this product without "agreements and joint action with every
20
other team."
Second, the court held that the NFL clubs had not combined to exclude competitors or potential competitors from the market. 20 2 Smith,
as a football player, was never seeking to compete with the NFL clubs
and no decrease in competition for providing football entertainment to
the public resulted.
The Smith court noted that "[w]hen confronted with concerted refusals to deal that do not fit the classic 'group boycott' pattern, the
courts almost without exception have held the per se rule inapplicable. '"203 In the case of sanctioning organizations, which oversee sports,
the rule of reason has been frequently applied.2 0 4 In addition, the Smith
court held that the per se rule should not be applied to "concerted refusals that are not designed to drive out competitors but to achieve
some other goal."' 20 5 The courts have refused to invoke the per se rule
where the "need for cooperation among participants necessitated some
as they do for all other students, and to determine the number and value of athletic scholarships would enhance competition rather than destroy it." Id. at 47, 51.
196. Defenders of the NCAA contend that the regulations it imposes on college
athletics enhance amateur competition. There is little doubt that many of the
NCAA rules, particularly the rules of play, are useful. However, the blanket mandate of uniform academic standards and scholarship limitations for all NCAA
schools does not enhance competition.
McCormick & Meiners, supra note 190, at 49.
197. 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
198. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1977)(quoting L.A.
SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST, at 245 (1977)).
199. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1179.
200. See also Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
801 (1977); Levin v. NBA. 385 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); San Francisco Seals v.

NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969 (C.D. Cal. 1974); R.

BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX

(1978),

(citing the joint venture characteristics of, respectively, the NFL, the NBA and the NHL).
But see Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984), upholding directed verdict issued by district court holding
the NFL not to be a single entity.
201. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1179.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1179 n.22.
204. See United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, Inc., 665 F.2d 781, 787
(7th Cir. 1981); AIAW v. NCAA, 558 F. Supp. 487 (D.C.C. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 577 (D.C.
Cir. 1984);Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983); Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v.
United States Tennis Ass'n, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 1103 (D. Neb. 1981), aff'd, 665 F.2d 222
(8th Cir. 1981);Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
205. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1180:
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type of concerted refusal to deal ....

329

, 206

The court reasoned that since it could not be said that the draft had
"no purpose except stifling of competition" or that it is without "any
redeeming virtue," it should not receive per se analysis.
The court analyzed that the draft forces each seller of football services to deal with only one buyer, thus robbing the seller of any real bargaining power. The Smith court then stated:
NFL teams are not economic competitors on the playing
field, and the draft, while it may heighten athletic competition
and thus improve the entertainment product offered to the
public, does not increase competition in the economic sense of
to enter the market and to offer the prodencouraging others
20 7
uct at lower cost.
The anticompetitive evils of the draft could not be balanced against its
procompetitive virtues. 20 8 The Smith court assessed the procompetitive
20 9
effects of the draft as "nil."
The Smith definition of competition as competition for players, not
competition on the playing field, is contrary to a potential NCAA argument that Proposition 48 is procompetitive because of what it accomplishes on the playing field. The court in Smith labeled the draft
anticompetitive because of its "effect on the market for players' services,
because it virtually eliminates economic competition among buyers for
the services of sellers." '210 A court attempting to balance the procompetitive virtues of Proposition 48 against its anticompetitive evils under the
Smith analysis could well conclude that Proposition 48 is not
procompetitive.
The Smith court referred to ProfessionalEngineers for the proposition
that the purpose of antitrust analysis is to form a judgment about the
competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a
policy favoring competition is21in the public interest, or in the interest of
the members of an industry. '
206. Id. See also Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977).
"[I]n an industry which necessarily requires some interdependence and cooperation, the
per se rule should not be applied indiscriminately." Id. at 652-53. Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
207. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186.
208. It should be noted that player drafts and other restrictions are permissible under
the non-statutory labor exemption when they are negotiated with a union. See McCourt v.
California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812 (D. Minn.
1988), rev'd, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989). For an analysis of the development of the nonstatutory labor exemption, see Closius, Not at the Behest of NoniaborGroups: A Revised Prognosis
fora MaturingSports Industry, 24 B.C.L. REV. 341 (1983). In Smith, the union had not agreed
to the restriction in question. In the Proposition 48 case, there is no union involved in
representing college athletes. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the decision to adopt
Proposition 48 should receive the same type of protection from the antitrust laws as is
afforded collectively bargained restraints.
209. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186.
210. Id.
211. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978).
See also Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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The Smith court cited less anticompetitive alternatives. With Proposition 48, there may also be less restrictive alternatives which have not
been explored by the NCAA. 2 12 A restraint will survive scrutiny "only if
it is demonstrated to have positive, economically procompetitive benefits that offset its anticompetitive effects, or, at the least, if it is demonstrated to accomplish legitimate business purposes and to have a net
2' 13
anticompetitive effect that is insubstantial.
In Board of Regents, the Court stated, "whether the ultimate
finding is
the product of a presumption or actual market analysis, the essential
inquiry remains the same whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition. '2 14 Furthermore, the Court observed that "there
'2 15
is often no bright line separating per se from rule of reason analysis."
21 6
Thus, even though a court may decline to apply a per se test,
the rule
of reason test may not always require the kind of detailed analysis that
has been required in the past. 2 1 7 Nevertheless, whatever test the Court
chooses to apply, the sine qua non of the inquiry remains the procompetitive aspects of the restraint.
V.

CONCLUSION

In a Sherman Act challenge to Proposition 48, it is presumed that
the NCAA would raise the justification that Proposition 48 is intended to
promote the athlete's pursuit of an education. In the 1989-90 NCAA
Manual, the NCAA sets forth certain principles governing eligibility.
The Manual states that "[elligibility requirements shall be designed to
assure proper emphasis on educational objectives, to promote competitive equity among institutions and to prevent exploitation of student
212. University of Iowa President Hunter Rawlings proposed in April of 1989 that the
University of Iowa limit all freshman participation in intercollegiate athletics. Freshman
Eligibility Shows Mixed Results, Cedar Rapids Gazette, May 1, 1989, at 10A, Col. 2. In addition, Charles Reed, Chancellor of the Florida State University system, has proposed to ban
freshman eligibility and to delay the start of the basketball season until mid-December at
Florida's nine publicly financed universities. Cuts at 9 Florida Schools Asked, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 21, 1989, at 34, col. 1.
According to a recent survey conducted by the NCAA's Committee on Basketball Issues, Division I Coaches and Athletic Directors voted 207-56 and 99-97, respectively, to
recommend declaring freshmen ineligible for Division I men's basketball if they are allowed four subsequent years of eligibility. Freshman Ineligibility A Real Possibility, USA Today, Sept. 22, 1989, at 9C, col. 2. The committee also endorsed a proposal to limit
athletes to three years of eligibility, with a fourth "conditioned upon ... being within 24
semester or 36 quarter hours of graduation." Id.
213. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1189.
214. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 84, 104 (1984).
215. Id. at 104 n.26.
216. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (holding that the
more discriminating examination under the rule of reason may be appropriate in situations where competitors operate with some form of joint agreements).
217. For example, in Board of Regents, the Court first determined that the restriction in
question "on its face constitutes a restraint upon the operation of a free market." 468 U.S.
at 113. The burden then shifts to the petitioner (defendant) to establish an affirmative
defense which "competitively justifies" the deviation from the operations of a free market.
After disposing of the petitioner's two proffered justifications, the Court deemed the restraint illegal under the rule of reason. Id.
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athletes." 21 8
In Denver Rockets, the NBA similarly asserted that its regulation was
necessary to guarantee that each prospective basketball player had the
opportunity to complete four years of college.2 1 9 The court noted that:
However commendable this desire may be, this court is not
in a position to say that this consideration should override the
objective of fostering economic competition which is embodied
to be made, it
in the antitrust laws. If such a determination is220
must be made by Congress and not the courts.
Furthermore, the argument that Proposition 48 is necessary to promote an athlete's pursuit of educational goals is flawed by studies which
indicate that only 27% of NBA players actually obtain college degrees. 2 2 1 Obviously, the vast majority of the players who do compete
for the full four years and later enter the NBA do not receive a college
degree. 2 22 This data shows the fallacy in assuming that attending college for four years necessarily leads the NBA bound college basketball
player to a college degree.
The view that many athletes do not attend college primarily to receive an education has been amplified in a recent case. In Hall v. University of Minnesota,2 23 the court set forth an "economic reality" test, taking
the position that the student-athlete is not in college merely for an edu218. See NCAA MANUAL § 2.9 (1989-90) The Principle Governing Eligibility. The manual also contains § 2.11, The Principle Governing Playing and Practice Seasons, which
states, "[t]he time required of student-athletes for participation in intercollegiate athletics
shall be regulated to minimize interference with their opportunities for acquiring a quality
education in a manner consistent with that afforded the general student body." But see
REPORT No. 3: THE EXPERIENCES OF BLACK INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETES AT NCAA DIvIsION

I INSTITUTIONS, Center for the Study of Athletics, American Institutes for Research 37

(Mar. 1989) citing the same Institute's REPORT No. 1, which found that "[D]ivision I football and basketball players spend more time in their sports during the season than they
spend preparing for and attending class combined." Black football and basketball players
also spend more time on their sports than on their studies and the "reason probably has to
do . . . with the nature of intercollegiate athletics." Id. at 41.
219. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066 (C.D. Cal.
1971).
220. Id.
221. Quote from Keith Lee, Associate Director of the Center for Sport in Society, Jan.
24, 1990, in phone conversation with one of the authors.
222. The typical NCAA Division I basketball team plays nearly thirty games in a fourmonth period, running from December to early March. Usually, a team will have to travel
to its opponents' site for approximately half of its games. Many teams have conference
tournaments, and sixty-four teams participate in the NCAA tournament, which does not
generally conclude until early April. Given the time constraints of games and practice, and
the fact that the NCAA basketball season runs through the fall and spring semesters at
most colleges, the low graduation rate is not surprising.
At the NCAA annual convention in January, 1990, the NCAA voted to reduce the
number of regular-season basketball games from 28 to 25, move the beginning of basketball practice from October 15 to November 1, and move the opening date of the basketball
season from the fourth Friday in November to December I. NCAA Restricts Practices, Seasons, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, at 46, col. 4.

223. 530 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D. Minn. 1982). Although Hall involved constitutional
issues, its analysis of the economic aspects of collegiate athletics is also applicable to antitrust law.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:2

cation. 2 24 The court, in addressing the suit of an NCAA Division I basketball player who was ostensibly ineligible, stated that "[t]he plaintiff
and his fellow athletes were never recruited on the basis of scholarship
..and are given little incentive to be scholars."' 22 5 The court observed
that "[t]he exceptionally talented student athlete is led to perceive the
basketball, football, and other athletic teams as farm teams and proving

grounds for professional sports leagues." 2 26 Placing the blame squarely

on the university for having fostered the business-like aspect of collegiate athletics, the court also said that the university, not the individual, should suffer the consequences for the lack of emphasis on
academics and the overemphasis on the money-making aspects of athletics. 2 27 The court stated that "[i]t well may be true that a good academic
program for the athlete is made virtually impossible by the demands of
their sport at the college level."12 2 8 Thus, the university cannot frustrate an athlete's effort to pursue a professional career, since the athlete,
according to Hall, is primarily at the school to compete in athletics, not
to go to school. 229 Lest there be any concern that the court in Hall is
224. One commentator on college athletics described the role of the big-time college
athletes as follows: "They're the serfs who toil in the feudal business of college sports,
generating hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue, through TV rights, tickets and souvenirs - all of it going to others." Philadelphia Enquirer, Oct. 15, 1989, (Magazine), at 16,
col. 3. Harry Edwards, a California sociologist who specializes in sports, describes the
system as "a slave system ... the athlete isn't receiving anything. He's just a victim of all
the greed, avarice and utter exploitation that colleges resort to." Id. at 34, cols. 2-3.
225. Hall, 530 F. Supp. at 109.
226. Id. But see NCAA MANUAL § 12.02 (1989-90). Amateur Student Athlete, which
states that -[a]n amateur student-athlete is one who engages in a particular sport for the
educational, physical, mental and social benefits derived therefrom and for whom participation in that sport is an avocation."
227. See R. Telander, A Question of Fairness, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 1, 1989.
The unfairness stems from the colleges' having laid most of the economic restrictions on the athletes and few on themselves. Players may not make money or sign
with agents until they're through with their collegiate careers. All they receive for
their efforts on the field or court are free educations, which some don't want or
aren't smart or mature enough to pursue. Either way, these athletes should not
be taking up space on college campuses.
Id.at 114. See also McCormick & Meiner, Sacred Cows, Competition and Racial Discrimination,
NEw PERSPECTIVES (Winter 1988). "Almost no one talks about the enormous sums of
money created by the play of lowly paid athletes. The situation, controlled by the NCAA
and its member institutions, borders on economic peonage." Id. at 48.
228. Hall, 530 F. Supp. at 109. One of the most venerated coaches in college football
history, Paul (Bear) Bryant, of the University of Alabama, expressed a similar view that
academics played a secondary role to athletics in college sports. He said:
I used to go along with the idea that football players on scholarship were 'student-athletes,' which is what the NCAA calls them. Meaning a student first, an
athlete second. We were kidding ourselves, trying to make it more palatable to
the academicians. We don't have to say that and we shouldn't. At the level we
play, the boy is really an athlete first and a student second.
J. KIRBY, FUMBLE 77 (1977) (quoting Paul (Bear) Bryant).
229. Big Ten Commissioner James Delaney has stated that:
I'm not comfortable with keeping a student in school only because the colleges
and pros think this is where he should be. I don't think the colleges should be
acting in concert with the pro leagues. We should be about education. If someone isn't interested in an education and wants to turn professional, then he
should be allowed to do it.

Telander, A Question of Fairness, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 1,1989, at 114 (quoting Big Ten
Commissioner James Delaney).
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engaging in judicial hyperbole, the University of Minnesota president
confirmed to the NCAA special convention in 1987: "We in Division I
are in an entertainment business and we can't fool ourselves.''230
Hall presents a very unflattering scenario in its analysis of college
athletics. But the queasiness that a Hall-type analysis may create does
not diminish the veracity of the fact that big-time collegiate athletics and
academics are frequently incompatible. 23 1 But perhaps big-time college athletics have become such a substantial revenue generating indusviability is compatible
try that it is unrealistic to think that its continuing
23 2
with traditional notions of amateurism.
There is widespread disagreement as to the effectiveness of Proposition 48 within the academic and athletic communities. 2 33 John Chaney, the Temple University basketball coach and a critic of Proposition
48, says that Proposition 48 will not markedly change the quality of education. He stated, "ft]hey're not going to move in the direction of teaching the kids in these schools. They're certainly not going to do anything
230. TELANDER, THE HUNDRED YARD LIE 191 (1989) (quoting University of Minnesota
President Kenneth Keller).
231. New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley, a former collegiate and professional basketball
player, is sponsor of the Student-Athlete Right-To-Know Act, S. 580, 101st Cong., Ist
Sess. (1989), which requires colleges and universities receiving federal financial assistance
to make public detailed information with respect to the graduation rates of student athletes. Colleges and universities would report annually to the Secretary of Education the
graduation rates of athletic-scholarship recipients, broken down by sport, sex and race.
Schools would be required to provide this information to all high school athletes being
recruited as athletic-scholarship candidates. In addition, students' national letters of intent would require the student to acknowledge that he or she has reviewed the report and
discussed it with a guidance counselor or principal.
The NCAA has opposed the Student-Athlete Right to Know Act, in part because it
may violate federal privacy laws which require that the academic records of individual students be kept private. Jim Marchiony, the spokesman for the NCAA, said, "[tihe opinion
of the colleges and universities within the NCAA is that, while the intent of the bill is good,
it is not something that should be federally legislated." N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1989, at 18,
col. 3.
At the NCAA annual convention in January, 1990, the NCAA voted to require Division I and II schools to provide data to be published annually on graduation rates of athletes. Senator Bradley was quoted as saying, "[I] am very pleased by the NCAA's action
.... The NCAA Division I and Division II schools were nearly unanimous in their support
of requirements to release graduation rates to future student athletes and families. This is
fully consistent with the legislation that we have sponsored." NCAA Restricts Practices, Seasons, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, at 46, col. 4.
232. Representative Tom McMillen, (D-Md.), says, "[w]e'll never get the genie back in
the bottle because there's too much money, too much infrastructure, too much television.
But what we can do is build a fort around it to bring America back into perspective." N.Y.
Times, Oct. 10, 1989, at 18, col. 1. Charles Grantham states that, "[t]he business of college basketball, like the business of professional basketball is simply about money and
today money abounds in basketball because it's great entertainment and the game is
played like its never been played before by an endless supply of great athletes." It's Time to
Give College Players a Cut, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1990, at 10F, col. 2.
233. There was even more disagreement when the NCAA introduced Proposition 42.
Georgetown University Coach John Thompson, protesting the NCAA's adoption of Proposition 42, walked off the court in a January 14, 1989 game between his team and Boston
College and did not appear for his team's January 18 game against Providence. Thompson returned to the court after NCAA officials agreed to recommend postponing enactment of Proposition 42 until the NCAA finishes a five-year study examining whether
standardized test scores can predict collegiate academic success. Griffin, GEORGETOWN 7
(Winter 1989).
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more because the NCAA says it. Ninety-nine-and-a-half percent of their
students have nothing to do with athletics. Why should they change
their curriculum? ' 23 4 James Zumberg, President of the University of
Southern California, disagrees with Chaney. He said, "[g]iven sufficient
time, I believe Proposition 48 will ultimately have high schools direct
more effort to academic preparation.' '235
The whole system of intercollegiate athletics has come under criticism relating to abuses within the system. 23 6 One commentator has
noted:
The charade of amateurism and the "student-athlete," the relentless pursuit of revenue by autonomous, self-aggrandizing
athletic departments; the see-no-evil-attitude of egocentric,
out-of-touch coaches; the unwritten restraint of trade collusion
between the NCAA and the NFL - although that policy appears
to be in tatters - prevent college players from entering the pros
until they have exhausted their collegiate eligibility, while
al23 7
lowing the NFL to use the colleges as its minor league.
Based on the foregoing analysis, it appears that a Proposition 48
student-athlete could prevail on a section one Sherman Act challenge to
the NCAA restriction, either under a per se analysis or the rule of reason. A per se analysis would be more likely to benefit the individual
player, while a rule of reason analysis could ultimately invalidate the restraints of Proposition 48.
If Proposition 48 did not receive per se analysis, resulting in either
an injunction or summary judgment, the challenging athlete would almost certainly lose one year of eligibility. An extended rule of reason
inquiry, which by its nature involves a detailed examination of the facts
of the case, would consume valuable time and would probably constitute
a Pyrrhic victory for the athlete who would have lost a year of eligibility
while challenging the restraint.
Given the unique nature of the relationship among the members of
the NCAA, it appears unlikely that a strict per se analysis would be applied. Since a certain amount of cooperation is necessary to operate a
successful athletic program on a college or professional level, various
rules and regulations are necessary to assure the viability of such an endeavor. This makes it unlikely that a per se analysis would be applied in
the Proposition 48 situation, notwithstanding judicial predisposition towards application of per se standards in certain group boycott situa234. Proposition 48 Here to Stay, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Mar. 31, 1989, at 8C, col. 1.
235. Id.
236. The House Education and Labor Subcommittee held hearings on the state of collegiate athletics on May 18, 1989. William C. Friday, former President of the University of
North Carolina, is vice-chairman of a commission financed by the Knight Foundation and
formed to examine problems in intercollegiate athletics and to recommend reforms to the
system. Panel To Speak Reforms in Athletics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1989, at D27, col. 1. At an
interview to announce formation of the commission, Friday said, "[t]here is a place for a
good intercollegiate - athletics program at every college .... The problem is that we are

turning institutions of higher education into entertainment centers." Id.
237. A Question of Fairness, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 1, 1989, at 114.
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tions. 2 38 It appears more likely that a court would follow a rule of

reason analysis, either in a traditional sense 23 9 or the "truncated" or
"quick-look" rule of reason analysis as exemplified in NCAA v. Board of
Regents.240

The NCAA's ostensible goal of promoting scholarship among student-athletes is admirable, but pursuit of such an admirable goal does
not justify the NCAA's imposition of a restriction on would-be studentathletes which constitutes an illegal group boycott. The court in Denver
Rockets recognized the "commendable" desire of the NBA to give every
college basketball player the opportunity to graduate, but held that such
a desire could not override the objectives of the federal antitrust
laws. 24 ' As Judge Frank stated in upholding a major league baseball

player's antitrust challenge to a ruling of the Major League Baseball
Commissioner in Gardella v. Chandler, "[n]o court should strive ingeniously to legalize a private (even if benevolent) dictatorship. "242 In
light of Tarkanian, the NCAA may now be akin to such a dictatorship.
The desirability of the motives of Proposition 48 is not the issue. The
road to illegal behavior is frequently littered with good motives. As the
Supreme Court noted in Board of Regents, "[g]ood motives will not validate an otherwise anticompetitive practice." '24 3 The issue is whether
Proposition 48 can withstand antitrust scrutiny, given the Supreme
244

Court's requirement in Professional Engineers

2 45
and Board of Regents

that the conditions imposed by the restriction be procompetitive. It appears that the NCAA's Proposition 48 restriction may not be the least
anticompetitive alternative and may not satisfy the Supreme Court's requirement that such a restriction be "procompetitive."
VI.

SUGGESTIONS

If Proposition 48 cannot survive Section One Sherman Act scrutiny,
the question then remains: How can academic eligibility standards be
established for college athletes in a legal manner? One sports television
industry insider believes "the key to handling the problems is the total
involvement of the presidents and chancellors of the various schools.
They simply have to retake control of athletic programs. '2 46 Under
238. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 78-111 and accompanying text.
240. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). See supra note 41. See also remarks by the Honorable Janet

Steiger, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, before the 23d New England Antitrust
Conference, Cambridge, Mass., Nov. 23, 1989, (citing the approach in Massachusetts
Board of Registration in Optometry, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
22,555 (June 21, 1988),
which focuses inquiry first on whether the joint conduct by competitors is inherently suspect, then on whether any claims of efficiency justifications are plausible and factually
supportable).
241. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066 (C.D. Cal.

1971).
242. 172 F.2d 402, 415 (2d Cir. 1949).
243. 468 U.S. at 101 n.23.

244. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
245. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
246. J. SPENCE & D. DiLES, UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL 124 (1988). Indeed, the Florida
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such an approach, each individual school's academic administrators, not
the NCAA, could establish the guidelines for students to compete in extracurricular activities, such as intercollegiate sports. Such a return of
power to each campus would vitiate the arguably anticompetitive influence of the NCAA cartel in the Proposition 48 area, 2 4 7 by allowing individual schools, rather than the NCAA, to make decisions involving each
school's athletic program. 24 8 One college president recently wrote that
"[c]ollege and university presidents are beginning to take a more active
role in the NCAA; clearly, they have the ability to bring about meaning2 49
ful reforms."
However, perhaps only a Pollyanna 250 would think that, in this day
and age of multi-million dollar college athletic budgets 2 5 ' and an emphasis on successful, winning, college athletic programs, individual college administrators would deal with athletic eligibility issues in a
reponsible manner. Indeed, the same commentator who suggested the
key to handling college athletic programs is to return decision-making to
college administrators 2 52 also questions the resolve of college presiBoard of Regents recently voted to put university presidents in control of athletic booster
groups. This move will give the presidents both authority over executive directors of organizations that raise or spend money for the benefit of the university and approval of the
budget and expenditures of the booster groups. USA Today, December 15, 1989, at 13c,
col. 1.
NCAA Executive Director Dick Schultz recently expressed a similar view. He said,
-[r]ight now, colleges and universities are not perceived as controlling their athletics programs . . . . You are what you are perceived to be. We need to re-style some things.
Universities need to be in control of their athletic programs, and I'm not so sure they
always are." In College Sports, the Real Players Collect Millions From the Networks, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 31, 1989, at 6E, col. 2.
247. See supra note 30.
248. It is important to note that the viability of this approach is predicated on each
school making its own eligibility decisions.
249.

Muse, Letter to the Editor, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 18, 1989, at 5.

It should be

noted that the college adminsitrators, in taking such action, would still be participating
under the NCAA cartel. Muse, President of the University of Akron, is "encouraged" by
the formation of a task force, headed by the Reverend Theodore Hesburgh, President
Emeritus of Notre Dame, and William Friday, President Emeritus of North Carolina, to
study reforms in collegiate athletics.
President Muse recommends three changes from the current system. First, "[rieduce
the economic motivations for winning" by distributing the proceeds of the NCAA men's
basketball tournament to all of the Division I schools, with those schools playing in the
tournament receiving set percentages and the noncompeting schools receiving an even
share of the remaining funds. In addition, schools participating in football bowl games
"should be required to contribute a share of their proceeds to the NCAA for equal distribution to all other schools participating in that division." Second, Muse advocates allowing football players to go to the NFL at the end of any school year, because "if it is the
player's objective to participate in professional athletics, we ought to allow him to take
advantage of the opportunity when it arises." Muse reasons that other students can drop
out of school and go to work at any time. Third, Muse favors requiring that each school
treat its athletes the same way it treats its other students with regard to admission and
retention standards and to eligibility for participation in extracurricular activities. Muse,
Letter to the Editor, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 18. 1989, at 5.
250. "[Ain excessively or blindly optimistic person . . . [from the name of the child

heroine created by Eleanor Porter (1868-1920), American writer]." THE RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, (2d ed. 1987).
251. See supra note 31.
252. J. SPENCE & D. DILES, supra note 245 and accompanying text.
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dents and chancellors in taking matters into their own hands, when a
253
losing athletic program may result from tightened standards.
If the morass that is intercollegiate athletics is not reformed from
within, there are signs that Congress may step in to regulate the intercollegiate sports industry. United States Representative Tom McMillen,
a knowledgable observer of the existing situation in intercollegiate athletics and a former college and NBA basketball player, states that "[t]he
NCAA is at a crossroads. The question today is: Will the colleges get
back to their original mission of educating young people? A few more
Lennie Bias 2 5 4 stories could open a Pandora's box that would force
' 2 55
Congress to begin micromanaging the affairs of the NCAA."
Perhaps the legal solution to the struggle between Proposition 48
and section one of the Sherman Act emanates from an unlikely sourcethe pot of gold generated by intercollegiate sports. 25 6 In the aftermath
of CBS television's agreement to pay $1 billion to televise the NCAA
basketball tournament from 1991 to 1997, NCAA Executive Director
Dick Schultz was quoted as hinting that "major reform" to college athletics might result from the windfall. Schultz was quoted challenging
NCAA committees "to come up with new ways of distributing this
money . . . " citing possibilities such as to "give the [NCAA Basketball
tournament] qualifying schools substantial expense money and a small
amount for winning . . ." and to "[a]ward more money to schools that
'25 7
give more athletic scholarships, possibly tying it to graduation rates."
Executive Director Schultz reportedly said that "creative" proposals to
"spread the wealth" 2 5 8 would be considered by the NCAA. 259
One "creative" proposal could "spread the wealth" where it is most
deserved: to the athletes who are largely responsible for generating the
revenues, and, thereby, help provide a framework to protect the NCAA
from antitrust attack for its cartel-like behavior in adopting Proposition
260
48 and other similarly anticompetitive measures.
253. Id. at 125-26.
254. Len Bias was a former University of Maryland basketball player who died of a
cocaine overdose, just hours after he was drafted by the Boston Celtics of the NBA. See L.
COLE, NEVER Too YOUNG TO DIE: ThE DEATH OF LEN BIAS 7-61 (1989).
255. Krupa, The Big Squeeze in College Athletics, SPORTS INC., Jan. 9, 1989, at 14, col. 2.
256. Under the current arrangement, the NCAA's $56.8 million take from the 1990
NCAA Basketball tournament will be divided as follows: Forty percent ($22.7 million) to
the NCAA; $274,845 to each of the 32 first-round losers; $549,689 to the 16 second-round
losers; $824,534 to the 8 third-round losers; $1,099,379 to the 4 fourth-round losers; and
$1,374,224 to the final four teams. Colleges Plan to Share the CBS Billion, N.Y. Times, Nov.
23, 1989, at 42, col. 3.
257. Next NCAA Challenge: How to Split the Take, USA Today, Nov. 22, 1989, at 3c, col. 1.
258. Colleges Plan to Share the CBS Billion, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1989, at 42, col. 2.
259. To this end, the NCAA's Executive Committee agreed to create a special panel to
study ways to distribute the $1 billion. It was anticipated that the special committee would
make its recommendations to the NCAA budget committee in July, 1990, and a final decision was expected as soon as August, 1990. NCAA Names Panel on TV Deal, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 5, 1989, at 45, col. 1.
260. Another creative proposal for the distribution of the new-found wealth is suggested by Neil H. Pilson, President of CBS Sports, who notes:
In the next five years, we estimate that the entire television industry will dispense
between $1.2 billion and $1.5 billion to colleges and universities. But that money
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If the NCAA were to compensate, in some manner, the Division I
basketball players from the proceeds generated by televising the NCAA
basketball tournament, benefits could accrue to the players 26 ' and to the
NCAA itself. The benefit to the players is obvious and fair: in return for
performing the hundreds of hours of service required of them, they receive some monetary compensation out of the hundreds of millions of
dollars they generate. The players' receipt of compensation for performing their athletic services could enable them to organize under the
National Labor Relations Act 2 6 2 to form a union to negotiate the player/
263
employees' terms and conditions of employment.
A direct benefit could redound to the NCAA from the player/employees' ability to organize and collectively bargain the terms and conditions of their employment. The Supreme Court has held that, in order
to properly accommodate congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets with congressional policy favoring collective
bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act, certain union-employer agreements must be granted a limited nonstatutory exemption
from antitrust sanctions. 264 The non-statutory labor exemption may
thus insulate from antitrust challenge certain otherwise-illegal restrictions if such restrictions, such as Proposition 48 are collectively
bargained.
In the seminal sports labor-exemption case, Mackey v. NFL,2 6 5 the
court fashioned a three-part test "governing the proper accommodation
of the competing labor and antitrust interests involved here."'2 66 The
test requires that: 1) the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may
potentially be given preeminence over antitrust laws where the restraint
on trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining
relationship, 2) federal labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail
only where the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining, and 3) the policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust
laws only where the agreement sought to be exempted is the product of
should be viewed by college administrators as a positive force and as an enormous and attractive resource for higher education. It is money the educational
institutions do not have to raise from tax payers, parents, alumni and students,
and it is money they can use for any purpose: to build new classrooms or dorms,
to reduce tuition, or to pay coachs' salaries." TV Cash can give Colleges High Marks,
N.Y. Times, April 1, 1990, at IOF, col. 3.

261.

Charles Grantham, Executive Director of the National Basketball Players Associa-

tion, has proposed the establishment of individual trust accounts for players at schools
where basketball is a revenue-generating sport. It's Time to Give College Players a Cut, N.Y.

Times, March 18, 1990, IOF, col. 5.
262. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151-157 (1982).
263. Id. at § 157 (1982).
264.

See Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,

421 U.S. 616 (1975); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,
Inc., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
265.

543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 401 (1977)..

266.

Id. at 614.
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26 7
bona fide arm's-length bargaining.
It would seem that the eligibility issue unilaterally addressed by the
NCAA through the adoption and implementation of Proposition 48
could be shielded from antitrust attack by the non-statutory labor exemption. If the NCAA were to earmark a share of its recent billion dollar television windfall for player compensation, thereby making the
players employees, the players could unionize to negotiate terms and
conditions of employment with the NCAA. It seems that the subject
matter of Proposition 48, determination of player eligibility, is an area
268
which would fall squarely under the three-pronged test of Mackey.

It is evident that the NCAA may be subject to antitrust attack by a
Proposition 48 victim or victims. 2 69 A successful antitrust challenge
under the Sherman Act rewards the challenging plaintiff with treble
damages 2 70 and attorneys' fees. 27 1 Permitting NCAA athletes to be
27 2
compensated for generating hundreds of millions of dollars annually,
and permitting them to organize to bargain collectively would benefit
the players in obvious ways. Such an arrangement could also benefit the
NCAA in derivative ways, by enabling the NCAA to protect itself from
antitrust liability emanating from such arguable restraints of trade as
Proposition 48.273
Presumably, the "system" of intercollegiate athletics will also benefit. The National Labor Relations Act places paramount importance on
encouraging parties to bargain collectively to establish the terms and
conditions of employment in a given industry. 2 74 A judge in a recent
sports case decision echoed this sentiment: "national labor laws establish that federal labor policy favors resolution of labor disputes through
collective bargaining ....-275
267. Id. See also Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988), modified, 690 F.
Supp. 812 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 888 F.2d 559 (8th cir. 1989); McCourt v. California
Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
268. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614. First, the eligibility restraint in question "primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship," in this case the player/
employees and the NCAA/employer. Id. Secondly, "the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of bargaining," in this case, wages, hours and working conditions. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Thirdly, the subject of eligibility
would, presumably, be the product of "bona fide arm's-length bargaining" if it were addressed in a collective bargaining agreement between the players and the NCAA. Mackey,
543 F.2d at 614.
269. See supra at Section V.
270. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
271. Id.
272. This article does not purport to address any potential compensation schemes.
273. Notwithstanding Justice Marshall's dissent in Flood v. Kuhn, where he states that
"benefits to organized labor cannot be utilized as a cat's-paw to pull employers' chestnuts
out of the antitrust fire," it is clear from subsequent case law development that management derives substantial benefit from the non-statutory labor exemption. Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258, 294 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Women's
Sports Wear Mfr. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949)). See also Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559 (8th
Cir. 1989); McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Kupp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
274. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
275. Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812, 818 (D. Minn. 1988).

DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 67:2

If NCAA athletes were cloaked in employee garb, in addition to
their athletic uniforms, Proposition 48 could be addressed in a collective bargaining context, and the player/employees would have a role in
determining less restrictive or fairer means of determining eligibility.
Granted, this is a radical idea which involves substantial deviation from
the NCAA's notions of traditional amateurism,2 76 but it is also an idea
which may immunize NCAA policy from antitrust attack, and benefit,
college athletes, in the process.

276. The NCAA MANUAL § 1.3.1 (1989-90) states, "[a] basic purpose of this Association is to... retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports."

